Религиозность и ее следствия в ценностно-нормативной сфере
The article is devoted to the study of the relationship between existential fulfilment as one of the indicators of psychological well-being, and religiosity among Russian citizens practicising Islam and Buddhism. We also compare existential fulfillment of Muslims and Buddhists and Russians from the general population. We understand existential fulfilment, based on A. Lӓngle’s existential analytical approach, as the personal realization of the four fundamental existential motivations (FMs). We first briefly consider how the main themes of the FMs are reflected in the world outlook and practice of both Islam and Buddhism. In an empirical study on a sample of Muslims (N = 181) and Buddhists (N = 131) we used the original Russian version of the Test of Existential Motivation and an “objective” indicator of religious involvement: a survey form for assessing religiosity level includes questions about the frequency of religious practices. A positive correlation was found between existential fulfilment and religiosity. Regression analysis showed that religiosity is a significant predictor of existential fulfilment, independent of the gender, age, place of residence of respondents and the method used for data collection. The level of realization of the 2nd FM, concerning emotionality and value of life, among Muslim participations, was significantly higher than among Buddhist participants. In the levels of realization of other existential fundamental motivations and in the general indicator of existential fulfilment, no significant differences were found between the representatives of two religious groups. Comparison of existential fulfilment indicators for Muslims and Buddhists with similar indicators for a neutral Russian sample from the general population demonstrated that the level of realization for all fundamental existential motivations was significantly higher for believers. Further studies are needed for testing our results in other countries and using representatives of other religions.
It has long been noticed that older people tend to be more religious than younger people. However, it is still disputable whether this fact should be attributed to people generally becoming more religious with age per se (age effect), or to the process of secularization, wherein earlier cohorts (to which the now older people belong) used to be more religious than those that appeared later, younger cohorts (cohort effect). We try to distinguish between these two effects using a multifactor model applied to World Values Survey data (1981–2014) and find that at least in the developed countries the age effect strongly prevails over the cohort effect. This finding has important implications, e.g., that population aging in OECD countries can possibly slow down the transition from religious to secular values. This effect is already visible in some countries, such as Japan.
Religion or Communist Legacy? The Influence of Religion on Welfare Attitudes in Europe
The paper studies whether welfare attitudes of the Europeans are effected by religiosity of individual- (via degree of religiosity and religious affiliation) and contextual-level (via predominant religion and average religiosity). Results of multilevel statistical analysis performed on the data from ESS-2008 for 27 countries of Europe suggest that religiosity is negatively associated with welfare support as well as being a Catholic or a Protestant. On the contrary, Orthodox Christianity leads to substantive increase in welfare support among respondents as both individual religious affiliation and predominant religion. Finally, in countries without Communist experience religiosity is visibly associated with decline in welfare support, while in PostCommunist countries all respondents are similarly supportive of welfare provision, and more religiosity does not lead to decline in welfare support.
European countries are culturally close, still showing great variance in political participation rates as well as in predominant religions and state-church relations experience, what makes this region a good case for comparative research. Given this, it becomes important to study if members of different confessions differ in political participation rates, or the main cleavage lies between religious and non-religious people regardless of religious tradition? Does Orthodoxy really lead to lower levels of political participation or what we see is the effect of political regime or Communist legacy? Statistical analysis results suggest that regular attendance of religious services and praying does increase chances to participate in politics. This pattern holds for followers of all major European religious traditions and in countries with different predominant religions. On the other hand, most inter-confessional differences in political participation appear weak and unstable, while both belonging to an Orthodox religious tradition and living in a predominantly Orthodox state exert a stable and negative effect on political participation. Additional tests suggest that there is no difference in political participation between Orthodox Christians from predominantly Orthodox states and those where they form only a minority. Consequently, it is something in a religious tradition itself that decreases political participation.
The article discusses the concept of "religious person", the substructure of personality religious rights (religious consciousness and religious behavior and religious relations), analyzes the reasons for the classification types of believers, these foreign and domestic authors.
Several approaches to the concept of fatherhood present in Western sociological tradition are analyzed and compared: biological determinism, social constructivism and biosocial theory. The problematics of fatherhood and men’s parental practices is marginalized in modern Russian social research devoted to family and this fact makes the traditional inequality in family relations, when the father’s role is considered secondary compared to that of mother, even stronger. However, in Western critical men’s studies several stages can be outlined: the development of “sex roles” paradigm (biological determinism), the emergence of the hegemonic masculinity concept, inter-disciplinary stage (biosocial theory). According to the approach of biological determinism, the role of a father is that of the patriarch, he continues the family line and serves as a model for his ascendants. Social constructivism looks into man’s functions in the family from the point of view of masculine pressure and establishing hegemony over a woman and children. Biosocial theory aims to unite the biological determinacy of fatherhood with social, cultural and personal context. It is shown that these approaches are directly connected with the level of the society development, marriage and family perceptions, the level of egality of gender order.
This article is talking about state management and cultural policy, their nature and content in term of the new tendency - development of postindustrial society. It mentioned here, that at the moment cultural policy is the base of regional political activity and that regions can get strong competitive advantage if they are able to implement cultural policy successfully. All these trends can produce elements of new economic development.