Предварительные намерения и проблема заблудшей причинности
For any compatibilist theory of free will basing on the naturalistic worldview, it is difficult to reconcile propositional content of intentions with their specific causal implementation. We often fulfill our prior intentions in an absolutely unexpected way; nevertheless, they result in desired consequences. Then, there arises a question whether we should treat such an action as an accidental or intentional one. To answer this question the paper uses John Searle’s taxonomy of action and considers how a description of phenomenology of action may differ from a description of its real causes. We show why cases of wayward causation are relevant just for our prior intentions and are of no significance in situations when our action is an effect of our immediate intention.
In this paper, the author analyzes theories of free will proposed by neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner, and also engages with criticism of both theories by philosopher Daniel Dennett. In the end the author gives her own evaluation of these theories.
The philosophical essay “What is Freedom” by Hannah Arendt though modest in extent, serves as a kind of a key deciphering and elucidating the underlying import of her major works written both before and after this essay, namely “The origins of totalitarianism”, “Vita activa”, “On revolution”, “On violence” etc. Arendt analyses such concepts as “freedom of the mind”, “freedom of the will”, showing that the roots of the very phenomenon of freedom lie in the political realm. Freedom is a faculty of man to begin something new, non-existent in this world. It is a capacity to interrupt “automatic” processes in natural as well as political sphere. In the Preface the translator places the questions raised in essay in a wider framework of Hannah Arendt’s work.
The article discusses the process of formation and evolution of the concept of Free will in the period of late Anquity and Middle Ages and also reasons of the fact that this concept became a foundation of European interpretation of personality and social teaching of the Catholic Church. The analysis was conducted on the basis of official legal documents of the Catholic Church, as well as on the basis of writings of Doctor of the Church. The compilation of theological and legal approaches makes it possible to assess influence of the catholic teaching on the formation of legal doctrine and West European mental model in comparative perspective.
The Realist interpretation of 'War and Peace' - articulated by Martin Wight and Stanley Hoffmann - is based on Tolstoy's understanding of history as it is elaborated in his account of the Napoleonic invasion in the second epilogue of the book. There Tolstoy puts forward a mechanistic view of international relations which are assumed to be governed by inexorable laws of history determining human behaviour and limiting man's exercise of free will. However, Tolstoy's subjection of man to the workings of impenetrable laws of history in the second epilogue is at variance with a multiplicity of conscious moral choices that his three main characters - Nikolay Rostov, Andrey Bolkonsky and Pierre Bezukhov - make throughout the book. It is argued that the different treatment of the freedom vs. necessity problem in the fictional and historical narrative can only be understood contextually, i.e. from within Tolstoy' rejection of the Enlightenment tradition of scientific and moral inquiry.
This paper is devoted to the analysis of indeterministic models of causation in the analytic philosophy of action. At the beginning of this article, I deal with the most common in contemporary debates indeterministic theories authored by Robert Kane, Daniel Dennett, Alfred Mele and Laura Ekstrom. After critical examination of given theories and finding what in my opinion is their main difficulty I provide an alternative account of action. The approach seeks to integrate rationality inside the action itself and not on the specific causal chain preceding it as it became common since famous article of Donald Davidson “Actions, reasons and causes”. I propose to consider action as onotological entity consisting of three parts: 1) goal; 2) mean(s) to achieve goal; 3) teleological relation “for” between 1 and 2. Therefore, “Jim moved his arm to take a cup of tea” has 3 parts 1) taking a cup of teal; 2) Moving Jim’s arm; 3) “for” between 1 and 2. This account of rational action as I expect would escape some long-living paradoxes of causal theory of action. Finally I provide the concept of non-phenomenal will trying to explain some further properties of agency such as its “active” character and to close an explanatory gap between merely thinking about doing something and actually doing. This non-phenomenal will nevertheless is not meant as something necessarily transcendent and extra-natural, on the contrary it could match naturalistic point of view provided by neuroscience.
The problem of free will remains one of the primary unsolved problems of John Sealre’s philosophy. In his book ‘Freedom and Neurobilology’ (2007) Searle proposes two alternative hypothesis that would allow one to make sense of the nature of freedom, but ultimately finds both of them unsatisfactory. In this paper we propose a modified version of Searle’s argument, which attempts to reconcile the common sense intuitions with physiological determinism on the basis of Kahneman’s theory of cognitive systems. Specifically, we focus on the collision between the fast and the slow cognitive system as the basis for the experience of freedom.
The monograph presents a holistic view of the development of ideas, theory and practice of modern existential analysis. This view has allowed to demonstrate the contribution of existential analysis in psychology and its methodological potential as the basis for the construction of integral personality psychology, psychological counseling and psychotherapy, relevant modern scientific and socio-cultural context. The book is addressed to undergraduate and graduate students studying psychology and psychological counseling, practicing psychologists and psychotherapists, a wide range of professionals and researchers in the field of philosophy, social Sciences and Humanities.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.