Проблема удачи и противоречивость моральной ответственности в либертарианских теориях свободы воли

Философские науки. 2019. Т. 62. № 10. С. 102–120.

Mishura A.

 This paper aims to reveal the structural problem of libertarian accounts of free will. It is divided into three parts. In the first part, I formulate the main principles of libertarian accounts from the perspective of their values. I argue that there are two main understandings of autonomy that motivate libertarian project: causal-autonomy and substance-autonomy. Causal-autonomy refers to independency from the factors that are beyond the control of the agent. Substance-autonomy concerns the existence of the substance of self, which is self-sufficient and exercises control over person’s behavior. I show that different strands of metaphysical libertarianism could be understood within the context of this distinction. Agent-causal theories emphasize the value of substance-autonomy as a necessary condition for causal-autonomy. Event-causal libertarianism considers causal-autonomy to be sufficient for genuine freedom of will. In the second part, I discuss different formulations of the problem of luck. I show the respective advantages of compatibilist position in the context of the problem of luck and sketch the main strategies of libertarian responses to this problem. Four versions of the problem of luck are discussed: rollback argument, promise argument, the problem of contrastive explanation of action and Hume’s statement of the problem of luck. In the third part, I develop Hume’s criticism of libertarianism making this criticism independent from Hume’s denial of the possibility of causal indeterminism. I argue that causal account of action both in event-causal theories and in agent-causal theories leads to contradictory intuitions about agent’s responsibility in indeterministic universe. My argument purports to show that attributions of moral responsibility for indetermined actions are not grounded because person is intuitively both responsible and not responsible for these actions.

Keywords: либертарианство, свобода воли, libertarianism, free will, compatibilism, компатибилизм, moral responsibility, моральная ответственность, индетерминизм, indeterminism, luck, luck argument, free action, проблема удачи, свобода действия

Publication based on the results of: ­­ Semantics and Pragmatics of Agency (2019)