?
Выборы, тип режима и риски революционной дестабилизации: опыт количественного анализа
This article is devoted to the study of the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization. The authors study different approaches to estimating the probability of the occurrence of revolutionary events in the election year. The types of revolutionary actions are distinguished within the scope of the degree of use of political violence by opponents of the government, and the main reasons for the activation of the politically active part of the population both in autocracies and in transitional political regimes are determined. Among such reasons, the authors consider the fractionalization of elites, the activation of "dormant" institutions, the growth of political competence among individuals, the consolidation of the pro-democratic opposition and its institutionalization, electoral fraud and other manifestations of unfair political competition, the emotional involvement of the population in political processes, and so on. The study confirms the conclusion that elections contribute to the development of peaceful revolutionary protests and reduce the likelihood of armed uprisings. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the impact of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization is considered in a regime context. The authors investigate how elections influence violent or nonviolent revolutionary actions within the typology of J. Goldstone's political regimes (full autocracies, partial autocracies, factional democracies, partial democracies and full democracies). According to the results of the study, the authors came to the conclusion that, on the one hand, holding elections reduces the risks of armed revolutionary destabilization in all types of regime, except for factional democracies. On the other hand, unarmed revolutionary actions are more likely in an election year — in all types of regime, except for full democracies. At the same time, the holding of elections increases the risks of unarmed revolutionary actions in intermediate regimes/anocracies the most. However, even among anocracies, factional democracies stand out, where in the election year the risks of unarmed (as well as armed) revolutionary conflicts increase significantly more than in partial autocracies and partial non-factional democracies. At the same time, for consolidated democracies, the holding of elections is an inhibiting factor rather than provoking revolutionary destabilization. In full autocracies, the risk of unarmed revolutionary actions in an election year increases, but not as much as in intermediate regimes.