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Внешняя и внутренняя коррупция в организациях - типология и взаимосвязь (на примере полиции)
The authors introduce the concepts of “internal” and “external” organizational corruption and provide the analysis of their relationship based on the data of a comparative cross-country sociological survey of police officers in Russia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Latvia. The sample included officers of various ranks employed in various departments, in both large cities and small towns. Analysis of the data showed that in the studied post-Soviet countries, the level of corruption of the police is quite high. The highest level of internal corruption is in Kazakhstan, while in Latvia this level is relatively low; Bulgaria and Russia are in the middle, with a slightly higher level of corruption in Russia. In terms of external corruption, Russia is found to be in the lead, while the other three countries are not very different from each other. This difference between countries in the level and nature of corruption is explained by variations in the pace and characteristics of transformations in the post-Soviet period, both reforms of the police force itself and general political and socio-economic transformations. Although corruption solves some urgent problems of certain groups in the police, it causes systemic harm to the police as a whole. First, it worsens the quality of the police work, especially in that part of it that directly affects the population, worsening the relationship between the population and the police. It is also negatively associated with the crime rate according to the estimates of the police officers themselves, since, apparently, it reduces their ability to control the crime. Moreover, contrary to the widespread stereotype that informal earnings are a factor that attracts potential employees to the police in Eastern Europe, it turns out that, on the contrary, it is negatively associated with job satisfaction and is a factor that pushes officers out of the police, rather than attracting them. Apparently, this is a consequence of the high risks and additional costs associated with the informal earnings of the police officers. The authors make a paradoxical conclusion that large external corruption may have created potentially favorable conditions for relatively quick police reform. They argue that compared to a country with decentralized corruption Russia with its high level of corruption centralization might be more successful in case it embarks on the genuine anti-corruption reforms at the country level.