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Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν : Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in Plato’s Sophist

P. 143-155.

A crucial question Plato poses in the Sophist is how it is possible to say falsehoods: it involves the assumption that non-being exists (τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι), for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence (236 e – 237 a). Plato’s solution to this problem has been explored mainly in terms of the modern philosophy of language with an emphasis on the meanings of the verb “to be” (existential / copulative / veridical), types of predication (ordinary / definitional), the character of false statements (affirmative / negative) etc. It has been generally acknowledged that to understand the solution Plato offers to the so called “falsehood paradox” we must focus mainly on the propositional dimension of λόγος, on its subject-predicate structure. In sharp contrast, Heidegger endeavours to “get rid of propositions” (GA 19, 594/411) while interpreting the Sophist, and this endeavour will be our topic in this paper.

В книге

Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016.