Investor Myopia and Liquidity Preference as the Complementary Concepts
The paper contains attempt to develop coherent theory of investor myopia, which takes place when agents do not take long-term outcomes of their activity into account. Investor myopia is treated as a concept which is complementary to liquidity preference: both can lead to underinvestment. But, at the same time, the former is more long-run phenomenon which is concerned with serious defects of institutional environment. The main practical conclusion is that the State is responsible for overcoming of investor myopia. This phenomenon can be considered as the key to many fundamental economic problems of developing and post-transitional economies.
Self-reliance was a cornerstone of Ujamaa socialism – the ideology of Tanzania from 1967 till the mid-1980s. In the post-Cold-War period socialist ideology was actually abandoned, together with the really valuable concept of self-reliance. As most African countries, Tanzania is crucially dependent on foreign aid. We argue that aid can play a positive part for Tanzania and countries like it, but only if it promotes their self-development which, in its turn, is possible only if a nation is or strives to become self-reliant. However, in contemporary Tanzania the culture of self-reliance has almost disappeared since national ideology has changed, and many people rely on foreign aid and national government, not on their own hard work. At the same time, the union of foreign donors and corrupt national bureaucracy results in Tanzania in aid without development that, as in the case of aid for mosquito bed nets, cannot promote self-reliance and, hence, socio-economic progress.
The article presents a theoretical survey of different ways to analyze the effect coexistence of spot and forward markets has on incentives for non-competitive behavior. There is no common opinion in economic theory concerning the influence of forward contracts on incentives for non-competitive behavior in spot market. Several studies support the hypothesis that introduction of forward trading increases competition in the spot market by erosion of market power. But while it can reduce market power of an individual firm, forward trading facilitates tacit collusion in the market. This ambiguity demonstrates complexity of economic research, aimed at increasing social welfare.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
This book is about twenty-year's experience of privatization in different countries including Russia. The book also includes sestematozation of academic views at the problems of state failures and effectiveness of the state owership.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
In this article the author attempts to explain the events occurring in the country taking into account the specificity of the Ukrainian political culture. From the point of view of the author, a key player in the Ukrainian revolution in 2014 was the Ukrainian society itself, and any attempt to comment the situation of modern Ukraine, first of all, should take into account civil conditions of the society itself. Qualitative state of civil society in Ukraine outrun the quality of the ruling elite, which inevitably provokes new confrontations and conflicts.
The paper proposes a political and legal approach to conceptualizing modern democratic state as law-governed, social and secular. It defines legal, institutional, and socio-political characteristics of law-governed, social, and secular state.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.