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Article

Самоковариантные и согласованные решения кооперативных игр с трансферабельными полезностями

A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities -- self-covariance -- is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors themselves and their multipliers. A description of all nonempty efficient, anonymous, self-covariant, and single-valued solution for the class of two-person TU games is given. Among them the solutions admitting consistent extensions in the Davis--Maschler sense are found. They are the equal share solution, the standard solution, and the constrained egalitarian solution for superadditive two-person games. Characterizations of consistent extensions of these solutions to the class of all TU games are given.