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Интерпретации квантовой механики в свете информационной онтологии
The article analyzes the principal interpretations of quantum mechanics from the standpoint of an original conception of informational realism. It is shown that these interpretations can be unified within an informational ontology in which fundamental status is accorded to informational invariants of quantum constraints that are common to all empirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics. A distinction is proposed between two informational layers: epistemic information (measurement data and the updating of knowledge on their basis) and ontic information (invariant structures and constraints). The first layer varies across interpretations, whereas the second is preserved, which explains their experimental equivalence. The proposed informational ontology is compared with other realist approaches, and its advantages are formulated and argued for.
It is shown that all the interpretations considered, despite often incompatible philosophical foundations and worldviews, are equally dependent on a certain set of informational invariants, which prove to be primary with respect to any particular interpretation. This can be explained either by the fact that a unified descriptive model of real physical processes at the quantum level is still unknown, or – as argued in the present article – by the claim that the fundamental level consists of informational constraints, and that different descriptions are equivalent, with their differences explained by distinct perspectives. The novelty and contribution of the article consist in proposing an operational definition of a falsifiable class of invariants and constraints on operations that are stable under changes of perspective; providing a unified translational vocabulary for interpretations in terms of the two informational layers; showing that their empirical equivalence is explained by the preservation of the same ontic layer; and formulating a criterion for distinguishing interpretations from alternative theories. Taken together, this allows informational ontology to be regarded as a meta-position with respect to these interpretations.