This paper analyses different retrospective links between the scientia generalis by Leibniz and the philosophical, rhetorical and encyclopaedic traditions of the Renaissance and Early Modern Europe, emphasising the influence of Aristotle’s’ “Metaphysics” on the genesis of the concept of universal science in 17th century philosophy.
The article analyzes a number of modern physics approaches in different aspects, which are directly or indirectly affected by the problem of space. The variations of cosmologies based on the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, the theory of inflation, the holographic universe model, the model of the virtual universe, etc. and their scientifically validated combinations are examined for specifics of category of space interpretation in each case. In reliance to the historical and philosophical analysis the connection between the traditional interpretations of the concept of space in philosophy and the modern ones in physics is established. The context of some modern physical theories is concluded to bring new dimensions to the understanding of space (while retaining certain classical concepts).
The article analyzes the problem of physical theory nature and its criteria in the context of several concepts of modern physics. Such physical concepts allow multiple possible universes (the last usually happens to be a random consequence of the theory). Since the study requires several universe models, which basic principles (physical laws) can vary, the two theories have become the objects of analysis: the first, which includes the concept of eternal inflation, the second – the string cosmology (the string landscape). Both theories allow for a large variation of physical laws (no matter, whether these are fundamentally different physical laws or different versions of the same basic principles). The amount of dark energy (cosmological constant) has been selected as a physical law parameter, changing its value in possible universes.
The analysis of the physical theories, which allow a multiplicity of universes, has shown that the standard requirements for the theory, which connect its veracity with the criteria of observability and the need for validation of our universe basic principles, are not entirely consistent. Theoretical physics is moving towards the formulization of models that become a real (in some cases, apparently irresistible) challenge for experimental verification. The article proves that such verification probably can not be required in several physical theories, since, in particular, the postulation of this kind of connection between theory and reality is no more than a manifestation of anthropocentrism. However, the theory can trace more general grounds that lie beyond the scope of human observation.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare model-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new game-theoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects.
The second law results in the growth of the entropy – in superficial interpretation this principle presumes that the sufficient energy inevitably turns into the substandard energy. Order turns into chaos over time; however, chaos also turns into order under certain circumstances. The first research objective is to establish the possible prescientific ideas about the phenomenon – some philosophical intuitions that have preceded the scientific discovery of the second law and have conformed to it in a certain sense. It is essential because there are always certain bonds and continuity in the history of philosophy and science – the correct interpretation of the phenomenon becomes difficult, if not impossible, without the establishment of such bonds.
Moreover, the main task is to understand what the second law is and which significance its principal corollaries have. We need to give the second law a correct interpretation that will allow making assumptions about its connection with time in the context of the initial state problem and about the possible new ways of modern physics development – in particular, the creation of the quantum theory of gravity. Two solutions to the entropy and initial state connection problem are proposed in the context of the time arrow discussion (G. Calender's approach to solving the problem is disputed).
The article shows that Marxist dialectics and the social philosophy of science, whose influence was obvious in Imre Lakatos’s early philosophical experiments, underwent substantial reinterpretation during the mature period of his creative activity. Being implicit heuristic sources of his “sophisticated falsificationism” or methodology of scientific research programs, they take on a conceptual form in which they lose the “excess” of authentic contents. Therefore, the philosophical views of “mature Lakatos” may be called close to the Marxist philosophy of science only with many important reservations and specifications.
The problem of time is not an entirely physical problem. Physics itself does not contain a "time theory". That is particularly true in the sense that physics has not made any direct attempts to find the natural-science definition of the notion of time. Nevertheless, the concept of time emerges in science one way or another and still requires an explanation. Time fulfills an important role in the physics of XX and XXI centuries, though often a hidden one. Such a statement could be applied to both theories of macrocosm and microcosm. In the theory of relativity, time has been established as a secondary feature, a derivative of velocity and mass. However, it exists (although, as an illusion) and yet evokes the need of its philosophical interpretation. In quantum field theory time also (though implicitly) occurs according to the interpretation of the experiment results - for example, “where the particle was before its observation”. Such “before”-cases indicate the very presence of time (more precisely, the observer`s perception of its presence). Further theories, which have been the attempts to solve the problem of incompatibility of general relativity theory and quantum mechanics, such as the theory of loop quantum gravity, superstring theory, Shape Dynamics and others, also mention the concept of time. Time fulfills there a definite role and again evokes the question of its explanation in the frameworks of these theories. Most importantly, to find an exact meaning of this “time” term used here. This article deals with the problem of time in the context of several theories of modern physics. In particular, it attempts to give a definition of the term of time in relation to the philosophy of physics (physics itself does not characterize it). Such a task formulation has its relevance and novelty due to the facts that the discourse on the nature of time is still stipulated by Zeno`s paradoxes, and the philosophy of science uses the obsolete vocabulary while describing the term. However, evidence suggests that modern physics has developed the new rules, or to be more precise, has stated the new principles, which the philosophy of science can not take into consideration without changing its vocabulary (the last also involves the modernization of intellectual intuition).
The article analyses the link between the famous French epistemologists Emile Meyerson and his younger friend and disciple, historian of science Alexandre Koyré. Koyré is known primarily by his research of the history of the scientific thought; his main interest was to grasp the moments of the transformation of rational structures within the history. Nevertheless, in this paper I will argue that Alexandre Koyré in some measure accepts Emile Meyerson’s claim on the immutability of human reason that constitutes the central point of Meyerson’s epistemology. But within the rationality in general he distinguishes the immutable core that is constituted by the logical laws of reasoning and the outer level of “mentality” which is subjected to the historical changes and transformations.
We suggest a solution to the problem of peer disagreement based on the concept of divergence in opinions, imported from the theory of argumentation. We treat the problem of peer disagreement as a mental experiment, a duel between different concepts of truth, and show that there is no winner in it, whenever there is a deep disagreement between epistemic peers. Our approach amounts to two proposals, one formulates how to handle the truth and the other takes care of creating an agreement over it. We suggest that instead of employing a definite concept of truth taken as criterion for dispute resolution from outside of it, the agents construct the concept of truth as a joint design project from the inside of their dispute and create an agreement towards it with the help of a procedure based on the of divergence in opinions. The concept of divergence of opinions opens a perspective of analyzing complex conflicts such as the deep disagreements by treating them as molecular disputes consisting of atomic simple ones. It supports discriminating between solvable and unsolvable disputes and paves a way for the disputants to construe a truth concept in their complex dispute by choosing in which of the atomic disputes to participate for the sake of their molecular dispute resolution. We also demonstrate how the conceptions discussed in the issues of the peer disagreement such as conciliatory and steadfast ways, justificatory balance and equal weight view get shape in our approach based on the concept of divergence in opinions.
This paper considers the problem of direct knowledge about oneself as a prerequisite of a self"consciousness. The explanation of the asymmetry between first and third person that is characteristic for such a knowledge could shed the light on the nature of self-consciousness as a natural phenomenon. The key to the problem is the asymmetry Donald Davidson proposed as the main feature of the process of interpretation. However, this solution is often either not fully appreciated or misunderstood as a kind of linguistic asymmetry. The paper argues that this asymmetry has a causal nature, and this is the first reason for irreducibility of our mentalist vocabulary and thereby for the necessary use of such concepts as selfconsciousness