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«Цветные революции» на постсоветском пространстве: стабильность и изменчивость режима как следствие отступничества элит
Why did «coloured revolutions» in Georgia (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and Ukraine (2004) happen? To answer
the question, the paper focuses on the shared feature of post-Soviet states – regime cyclicity, explained
by the existence of the entrenched patronal presidentialism institutions. At critical moments when the incumbent
turns into a lame duck and her departure is mostly expected, the regime runs the risk that elites become
disunified and strong opposition consequently emerges. Then the relationship between the incumbent’s designated
successor and elites revolves around the possible defection of the latter to the challenger. The article
models such a situation in the form of a repeated game, where elites appear as a receiver in the «bargain»
during the presidential campaign. Depending on who is preferred – the successor or the challenger – an outcome
is either regime perpetuation or a “coloured revolution” caused by mass elite defection to the opposition.
The derived hypotheses are tested on the cases of presidential elections in Russia (1999-2000) and
Ukraine (2004). As analysis reveals, the three theoretical expectations draw sufficient empirical support,
while a special role in determining a winner is ascribed to candidates’ popularity, which becomes of utmost
importance closer to the end of the race.