Бизнес и государство: к новой модели взаимоотношений
The purpose of developing a cognitive model has been defined as the construction and analysis of simulation models improve interaction between government and business. In line with this objective has been hypothesized that an increase in the efficiency of interaction between business and government increased the values of competition in politics and economics, which in turn are directly related to each other. The latter is not in doubt, since the state of competition in the economy is inextricably linked to the legislative machinery of antitrust restrictions, by which representative bodies suppress or support unfair competition.
Paper considers the efficiency of Russian court system and demand of economic agents for legal institutions. Analysis based on two empirical surveys of Russian firms in 2000 and 2007 focused on efforts to reform court system and the influence of state and enforcement agencies on firms’ behavior. Author notes the improvement of enforcement system in Russia in 2000s. However as before there are serious problems with corruption and inequality of state agencies and private firms in Russian courts.
To help right the imbalance in attention in between oligarch firms and the rest of the economy, we report results from two original surveys of 500 firms conducted in 2000 and 2007 in eight regions in Russia that explore the business environment for manufacturing and service sectors. We find that the formal and informal rules of the game for everyday firms in Russia have changed dramatically in the Putin years. Most importantly, while the informal and formal rules of the game were essentially the same for successful and unsuccessful firms in 2000, by 2007 regional governments in Russia had come to favor successful firms through a variety of informal and formal means in ways that were absent just seven years earlier. This shift in the rules of the game in favor of successful firms suggests that a core group of firms in the regions under study have managed to cooperate with the regional government to temper the weak institutional environment in Russia. On one hand, this arrangement is clearly a “second-best” option for economic development over more neutral rules that provide a level playing field for all firms. On the other hand, it is likely an improvement over “third-best” options that involve the state using its power to punish successful firms to reward less successful firms. More generally, this change in informal institutions in a relatively short time suggests that informal institutions are mutable than many accounts suggest.
The models of interaction between the main actors in public space are studied. Through the technology of Future Search the major steps for changing the models are considered.