Философия. Язык. Культура (Вып.2)
There is a chronological study in this paper consisting of three parts: 1) the conception of simplicity of God maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas, 2) rejection of God’s simplicity undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, and 3) an attempt to return to the idea of the simplicity of God in modern analytic research.
In this article is considering the process of a forming and evolution of the concept of yerro in the romance language of the first half of XIII cent. On basis of the bilingual texts of the period (Etimologiae of Isidor of Seville, Fuero Juzgo) and also of the official papers of Fernando III is making an analysis of the principal meanings of described concept in this period. Yerro during the reign of Fernando III was considered as a term more ethical than juridical and was used mainly for designate an error, a sin, a fault, but not a crime.
The main term of this article is the consequence for the problem of nomination, which comes from the main principle of Wittgenstein’s formal ontology: the world and the thinking of the world, expressed in language, have the same logical structure. The logical form itself expresses the forms of objects, which are space, time and color. Hence, the logical and the ontological necessity are identical, as well as the logical and the ontological possibility. Therefore the occurrence of objects in facts is determined by the logical space of possibilities and by nothing else. The occurrence of an object in a fact as something that is the case is accidental. Only the form, which is the form of any state of affairs, is necessary. The proposition “Rabbit cooks cabbage soup” is taken as an example for this statement. The properties of objects are the facts, in which they can occur. That’s why they are accidental. Thus, all objects are identical as the substance of the world, as material points in the logical space. That means that there’re infinitely many possibilities of their occurrence in facts. So, why rabbits do not cook cabbage soup but eat cabbage? This question can be answered only after addressing to what will make this accident not accidental. That is the sense, which lies outside the world.
H. Plessner sees the problem of culture in new, not a traditional for his contemporaries foreshortening: to the old schemes of opposition of cultural and animal being Plessner opposes the idea of coincidence of closeness of environment of an animal and openness of human world in an eccentric existence of a person. Such solution of a problem of culture is caused by the doctrine of Plessner about the eccentric positionality – the ontological structure of the person including both organic body and a specific to person intentionality to the world. In this very structure the relations of the person to the world and to himself are combined in such a manner that the openness of the person to the world without its simultaneous restriction is impossible, and such – uniform – structure of two-aspect being, distinguishes, according to Plessner, the person from the animal.