Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications: European Meeting on Game Theory, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 2015, and Networking Games and Management, Petrozavodsk, Russia, 2015
The importance of strategic behavior in the human and social world is increasingly recognized in theory and practice. As a result, game theory has emerged as a fundamental instrument in pure and applied research. The discipline of game theory
studies decision-making in an interactive environment. It draws on mathematics, statistics, operations research, engineering, biology, economics, political science, and other subjects. In canonical form, a game takes place when an individual pursues an objective in a situation in which other individuals concurrently pursue other (possibly overlapping, possibly conflicting) objectives, and at the same time, these objectives cannot be reached by the individual actions of one decision-maker. The problem then is to determine each object’s optimal decisions, how these decisions interact to produce an equilibrium, and the properties of such outcomes. The foundation of game theory was laid more than 70 years ago by John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern. Theoretical research and applications are proceeding apace, in areas ranging from aircraft and missile control to inventory management, market development, natural resources extraction, competition policy, negotiation techniques, macroeconomic and environmental planning, capital accumulation, and investment. In all these areas, game theory is perhaps the most sophisticated and fertile paradigm applied mathematics can offer to study and analyze decision-making
under real-world conditions.
An analysis of journals’ rankings based on five commonly used bibliometric indicators (impact factor, article influence score, SNIP, SJR, and H-index) has been conducted. It is shown that despite the high correlation, these single-indicatorbased rankings are not identical. Therefore, new approach to ranking academic journals is proposed based on the aggregation of single bibliometric indicators using several ordinal aggregation procedures. In particular, we use the threshold procedure, which allows to reduce opportunities for manipulations.
We study the structure of optimal customer acquisition and customer retention strategies as a differential game over an inﬁnite horizon in an industry with a large number of non-atomic ﬁrms. The optimal retention effort is constant over time and the optimal acquisition effort is proportional to the size of potential customer base. Greater customer proﬁtability leads to higher per- capita acquisition and retention efforts, larger size of ﬁrms, and lower churn rate. A greater discount rate leads to lower per-capita acquisition and retention efforts, smaller ﬁrm size, and a greater churn rate. Tougher competition lowers the ﬁrms’ acquisition and retention expenditures and it does not affect per-capita values. Both the churn rate and the share of acquisition expenditures in the total marketing budget decrease as ﬁrms grow over time. We revisit the concepts of the customer lifetime value (CLV) and the value of the ﬁrm in the dynamic equilibrium of an industry with a large number of players and demonstrate the equivalence between maximization of the value of the ﬁrm and maximization of a ﬁrm’s individual CLV.