Новый институциональный подход: построение исследовательской схемы
This paper develops a strategy for investigating the new institutionalism in economic sociology. An analytical scheme is proposed to link institutional arrangements, structure of incentives, and conceptions of control. Questions regarding the legitimacy of claims on resources and profits, contract enforcements, and business networking are discussed on the theoretical level.
The Routledge Handbook of European Sociology explores the main aspects of the work and scholarship of European sociologists during the last sixty years (1950-2010), a period that has shaped the methods and identity of the sociological craft. European social theory has produced a vast constellation of theoretical landscapes with a far reaching impact. At the same time there has been diversity and fragmentation, the influence of American sociology, and the effect of social practice and transformations. The guiding question is: does European Sociology really exist today, and if the answer is positive, what does this really mean? Divided into four parts, the Handbook investigates: intellectual and institutional settings regional variations thematic variations European concerns. The Handbook will provides a set of state-of-the-art accounts that break new ground, each contribution teasing out the distinctively European features of the sociological theme it explores. It will be of interest to students and scholars across the social sciences and humanities.
In accordance with the international investment legislation, a state is entitled to implement expropriation and nationalization measures with respect to foreign investments within its territory on condition of guaranteed prompt, efficient and adequate compensation provision in favor of investors. The article notes that there is no clear description of the phenomenon of foreign investors' property alienation in the Russian or world practice. Consideration is given to the types of expropriation: direct, aimed at deprivation of property rights for investments by authorities; indirect, or "creeping" expropriation representing gradual divestiture; and measures that are equivalent to expropriation and inhibit receipts of investment benefits. It is underscored that in the process of investment evaluation it is necessary to take into consideration the degree of intervention in property rights, intentions of the government, and the impossibility to discharge adequate investors' expectations.
Secure property rights are central to economic development and stable government, yet difficult to create. Relying on surveys in Russia from 2000 to 2012, Timothy Frye examines how political power, institutions, and norms shape property rights for firms. Through a series of simple survey experiments, Property Rights and Property Wrongs explores how political power, personal connections, elections, concerns for reputation, legal facts, and social norms influence property rights disputes from hostile corporate takeovers to debt collection to renationalization. This work argues that property rights in Russia are better seen as an evolving bargain between rulers and rightholders than as simply a reflection of economic transition, Russian culture, or a weak state. The result is a nuanced view of the political economy of Russia that contributes to central debates in economic development, comparative politics, and legal studies.
The chapter of the book systematically examine various effects of resource curse in such arenas as rule of law and property rights in Russia in comparison with the other oil-and-gas exporting countries beginning from the XXI century.
Effective property rights protection plays a fundamental role in promoting economic performance. Yet measurement problems make the relationship between property rights and entrepreneurship an ambiguous issue. As an advancement on previous research in this paper we propose a new approach to the evaluation of the security of property rights based on direct measures that overcomes some limitations of previous studies. We apply this new metrics to a survey of manufacturing firms in Russia to identify the economic effects associated with the lack of property protection in a transition economy. Our analysis supports the view that there is a close relationship between institutions, property rights and economic growth. Our findings confirm that redistributive risks provide a depressing effect on investment and innovative activity of manufacturing enterprises and potentially result in a huge loss in efficiency and economic growth, which in other institutional settings could have been avoided.