Не-возможность как амехания: феноменология смерти в работах Владимира Бибихина
This paper examines the conceptual transformations of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in Vladimir Bibikhin’s philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes Bibikhin’s phenomenology of death in the context of the ontology of time worked out in Bibikhin’s lectures “(It’s) Time.” The key difference between Bibikhin’s ontology and the one from “Being and Time” is the approximation of the past and the future in “(It’s) Time” based on Bibikhin’s interpretation of these tenses as the restrictions of human activity. The limit of this activity is death, in which, according to Bibikhin, “I will not be able to do anything.” Moreover, Bibikhin pulls together death and childhood memories as well as Heideggerian concepts of understanding and mood. This trends are most noticeable in the “Early Heidegger” workshop, in which Bibikhin uses certain excerpts from Heidegger’s works to ground the concept of death as impossibility of action. The comparison of Bibikhin and Kojève’s phenomenology of death shows that Bibikhin eliminates the reference to non-being from the concept of death. Nevertheless, Bibikhin’s thought continues some patterns of Heidegger and Kojève’s atheistic phenomenology. For instance, Bibikhin reduces the transcendence to the existential modes, in which it can be given. Therefore, Bibikhin in several cases describes the death not in philosophical, but in religious terms.
The volume contains the articles intitially held as talk at the conference "Is this real? Phenomenologies of the imaginary" at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy" (19-22.11.2013) as result of the research projects “Philosophical Investigations of the Body Experiences: Transdisciplinary Perspectives” (GAP 401/0/1164) and “Relevance of Subjectivity” (M300091201) in the Department of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Prague.
The author differs several approaches to law in classical eurasianism. These distinctions, on his opinion, are based on metalegal grounds – on «alleinheit» theory in the writings of L.P. Karsavin and on «phenomenological method» in the works of N.N. Alexeev
In this work two philosophical concepts are being examined: “world-picture” of Ludwig Wittgenstein and “lifeworld” of Edmund Husserl. The aim of this work is to show that these two concepts have much in common.
Cet ouvrage vise à déterminer la manière de travailler qui est propre à la philosophie phénoménologique et à la montrer à l’œuvre. Il s’agit pour cela de définir le changement phénoménologique d’attitude comme « dé-limitation » de la vie de la conscience et la méthode phénoménologique comme « enrichissement mobile de sens », pour apercevoir que la dé-limitation, à travers l’enrichissement de sens, conduit à l’institution d’un nouveau mode de recherche. Mais de quelles limitations le changement d’attitude libère-t-il ? Qu’apporte l’enrichissement de sens qui soit proprement nouveau ? Dans quelle mesure cette « nouveauté » serait-elle instituée dans le cadre de la phénoménologie ?
This book examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses.
The chapter explores the semantics and pragmatics of the Russian temporal syntactic phraseme ‘X to X,’ (a construction characterized by a semantically restricted set of lexical items able to fill in its syntactic variables) which expresses either the speaker’s surprise at the fact that events go as planned (surprising punctuality interpretation) or the speaker’s surprise at the fact that unplanned events go as if they had been pre-planned (surprising fateful coincidence interpretation). While the construction is not unique, and occurs in other languages, its preferred interpretations are language-specific. The chapter demonstrates differences between Russian and English outlooks on time, based on their fundamental differences in linguistic worldviews. According to one of the central key ideas of the Russian linguistic worldview, events are difficult for human subjects to control, as they are commonly controlled by outside forces, such as fate, and therefore surprising punctuality interpretation prevails in Russian. English, which does not view punctuality as something out of the ordinary, favours the surprising fateful coincidence interpretation of this syntactic phraseme. The idea of fate in relation to temporality is also found in other languages, as demonstrated by Bernard Charlier’s research on Mongolian temporality in his chapter in the current volume.
In the first part of the paper, I examine cases of acceleration of perception and
cognition and provide my explanation of the mechanism of the e®ect. The explanation
rests on the conception of neuronal temporal frames, or windows of simultaneity. Frames
have di®erent standard durations and yield to stretching and compressing. I suggest it
to be the cause of the e®ect, as well as the ground for di®erences in perceptive time
scales of living beings. In the second part, I apply the conception of temporal frames
to model observation in the extended time scales that reach far beyond the temporal
perceptive niche of individual living beings. Duration of a frame is taken as the basic
parameter setting a particular time scale. By substituting a di®erent frame duration, we
set a hypothetical time scale and emulate observing reality in a wider or a narrower angle
of embracing events in time. I discuss the status of observer in its relation to objective
reality, and examine how reality does change its appearance when observed in di®erent
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.