This is the first Russian translation of the treatise of Adelard of Bath «On the Same and the Different» (about 1110 AD). This prosimetrum, made according to the Boethius’ model (“Consolation of Philosophy”), is an example of the medieval Latin Platonism and it demonstrates how educational system in the 12th century copes with the disciplines of trivium and quiadrivium. The philosophical problematic and dramatic form which embodies this problematic makes Adelard of Bath one of the major predecessors of the School of Chartres.
This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind.
The article provides an overview of the creative evolution of well-known logic Alexander Karpenko (1946-2017), which held the position of head of the Department of logic Institute of philosophy Russian Academy of Sciences for seventeen years. I focus on his recent philosophical interests, in particular, on the most important idea of many possible worlds. Also, I take the liberty to note some key milestones of his life.
Translation: Basilius von Caesarea. Homilien Zum Hexaemeron. — Berlin : Akademie Verlag, 1997. — (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller Der Ersten Jahrhunderte (NF) ; 2).
Academic report: Second International Conference ‘HSE Semantics & Pragmatics Workshop’ : Moscow, September 4–5, 2018
This article is devoted to Harry Frankfurt's seminal paper "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." First, it describes the philosophical context of Frankfurt’s paper and explains the main features of the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise proposed by G. E. Moore as a possible solution to the problem of free will. Secondly, it reveals the general intuitions that motivate Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities. Thirdly, it examines Frankfurt’s account of free action based on the distinction between the desires of different orders in the structure of the motivational system of the agent. Fourthly, it explores some ways to criticize Frankfurt's thought experiment and some particular conclusions that were drawn from this experiment. The first strategy seeks to reveal some hidden alternates in Frankfurt's thought experiment that are enough robust to ground the moral responsibility of the agent. The second strategy uncovers the hidden assumption of Frankfurt’s experiment: it presupposes but does not prove that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. The third strategy concerns the new formulation of the principle of alternate possibilities. This new principle is supposed to be immune to the Frankfurt-type cases. This third strategy is further elaborated in the W-defense proposed by D. Widerker, who raised the question of whether we are morally justified to expect that the agent would do something else than he actually did in Frankfurt-type cases.
In the present article, I propose the following thesis: most of the problems related to the ethical choices in moral philosophy are false. This thesis might be illustrated with an example of the novel "Sophie's Choice" by William Styron. The main character of the novel (Sophie) faces a difficult choice being held in Auschwitz: she has to decide which of her two children to save; the other one will be sent to the gas chamber. At first sight, the question here is about ethical choices; however, there is no ethical choice in an authentic sense. We will consider four strategies to solve this problem, which provides by Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Wittgenstein. Hence, all attempts to find a philosophical solution to the problem of choosing between two valuable alternatives are hopeless. In this case, we either have to withdraw this issue from the purview of philosophy and bring it to the other fields of knowledge (e.g., evolutionary psychology explains Sophie's choice, using Darwin's theory), and to recognize the impotence of the Reason and assign the problem a regulatory status, as if it indicates the boundaries of what we can know in the field of moral philosophy.
This paper examines the conceptual transformations of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in Vladimir Bibikhin’s philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes Bibikhin’s phenomenology of death in the context of the ontology of time worked out in Bibikhin’s lectures “(It’s) Time.” The key difference between Bibikhin’s ontology and the one from “Being and Time” is the approximation of the past and the future in “(It’s) Time” based on Bibikhin’s interpretation of these tenses as the restrictions of human activity. The limit of this activity is death, in which, according to Bibikhin, “I will not be able to do anything.” Moreover, Bibikhin pulls together death and childhood memories as well as Heideggerian concepts of understanding and mood. This trends are most noticeable in the “Early Heidegger” workshop, in which Bibikhin uses certain excerpts from Heidegger’s works to ground the concept of death as impossibility of action. The comparison of Bibikhin and Kojève’s phenomenology of death shows that Bibikhin eliminates the reference to non-being from the concept of death. Nevertheless, Bibikhin’s thought continues some patterns of Heidegger and Kojève’s atheistic phenomenology. For instance, Bibikhin reduces the transcendence to the existential modes, in which it can be given. Therefore, Bibikhin in several cases describes the death not in philosophical, but in religious terms.