Идея восприимчивости к иному в трансцендентально-феноменологической традиции: от отрицания к переосмыслению
The claim that human understanding is grounded in receptivity of mind-independent reality, despite its historical anteriority and accordance with intuition of ordinary consciousness, becomes invalid in the process of development of phenomenological thought. The reason for denial of receptivity is a lack of conformity between separate sense data and concepts as involving unifying functions. An assumption that the results of the receptivity initially have connections also does not solve the problem of knowledge of “the things themselves”, because, generally speaking, these connections are different from connections of the things.
Denying receptivity to otherness phenomenology explains the manifold and originality of contents of consciousness in two alternative ways. The first way is that the things of the world with their horizons are formed as a result of passive synthesis (E. Husserl), and the second way is the assertion that the condition of knowledge is original openness of being (M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty). Husserl denies the receptivity, because for him phenomenology is egology, and subjectivity is the ultimate basis of explanation of the world. According to Husserl, the results of passive synthesis are the products of subjectivity, on the one hand, and the objects that are pregiven to egoic synthetic activity and make it possible, on the other hand.
The author shows that Husserl’s presentation of the problem is true: it is in subjectivity that the basis of our consciousness of the world is to be found. The concepts claiming the original openness of consciousness to alterity overlook this important issue and consequently face fundamental difficulties. As concerns Husserl's solution to the problem, it is also not acceptable. The given study proved the need for a new consideration and further rethinking of the concept of receptivity so that it could become a working concept of a transcendental-phenomenological theory of knowledge.
The volume contains the articles intitially held as talk at the conference "Is this real? Phenomenologies of the imaginary" at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy" (19-22.11.2013) as result of the research projects “Philosophical Investigations of the Body Experiences: Transdisciplinary Perspectives” (GAP 401/0/1164) and “Relevance of Subjectivity” (M300091201) in the Department of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Prague.
The article concerns R. Wollheim’s theory of twofoldness, the one of the most acclaimed analytical theories of pictorial representation. Wohhleim has pointed to the structural distinction of seeing pictures from seeing objects and situations face-to-face, thus proposing the theory of seeing-in and twofoldness. This conception presupposes the split, simultaneous seeing of the picture’s object and material surface. Considering the basic influences, features and shortcomings of Wollheim’s theory, author specifies the question of to what extent the scope of this theory is limited to artistic pictures. Alongside with this theory’s reconstruction and critique, the article provides its interpretation based on spatially-oriented definitions of twofoldness (B. Nanay, J. Kulvicki) coupled with the actualization of the distinction between representational content of a picture and its figurative content. The first one includes all spatial relations that can be seen in it, the second one – all that can be seen in it and described by non-abstract concepts. Wollheim reframed to apply this distinction to his notion on twofoldness. But it gives the possibility to bring out the convincing definition of twofoldness as the simultaneous visual experience of pictorial surface (i.e., some material object in viewer’s egocentric space) and of representational content (i.e., semantically active spatial relations which one sees in the picture). This interpretation may be considered a useful instrument for non-reductionist description of pictorial experience and pictures’ ontological duality, hence it is devoid of Wollheim’s psychologism while maintaining his focus on visuality. Moreover, it provides some opportunities for applying Wollheim’s theory beyond the contexts of analytical philosophy of pictures, thus connecting it to the problems of phenomenological and hermeneutic theories of image.
The author differs several approaches to law in classical eurasianism. These distinctions, on his opinion, are based on metalegal grounds – on «alleinheit» theory in the writings of L.P. Karsavin and on «phenomenological method» in the works of N.N. Alexeev
Plato’s interest in vision and the visual is multifaceted, and complex. Visual words and images are frequent in the dialogues along with many direct and indirect discussions of physiological, intellectual, and social vision. The increased emphasis in recent scholarship on the importance of visuality in Plato is a part of a ‘scopic turn,’ the effect of which was to ground interpretations of the history of western European philosophy and metaphysics in its entirety in certain optical premises.
This article discusses the legend of Saint Alexius from the perspective of the “discovery of the individual,” an issue that for many decades has been intensively debated by historians of European culture.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.