?
Воображаемые конституции: от полезной фикции до деструктивной утопии
In the context of the rapid changes in the modern world associated with globalization, informatiza tion, and the revision of ethical standards of mass behavior, legal theory faces a number of problems — the loss of consensus in understanding global constitutionalism, growing disagreements regard ing its values and principles, and unclear prospects for the future. What was previously defined as a social ideal is disappearing — a system of ideas about a perfect legal system that is both rational, fair, and effective and capable of serving as a guideline for legislators. This normative vacuum is de signed to compensate for the theory of imaginary constitutionalism — those ideal projects of the constitutional system, the competition of which reflects the rivalry of various ideologies, regions, and political trends for the image of the future global legal order. From these positions, it becomes pos sible to conduct a comparative study of imaginary constitutions in the coordinates of space, time, and the meaning of existence; in the categories of value, content, and procedural parameters; in systems of information encoding in images, symbols, and the language of their texts; in mechanisms of representation in public legal consciousness; as well as in the degree of influence on changes in real constitutionalism in the present and its transformation in the future. The result of this study is a conclusion about the defining role of the constitutional imagination as a mechanism for the cognitive construction of legal reality in conditions of increasing information and normative uncertainty, when the current state of affairs ceases to suit, and the future remains uncertain. This role is manifested in the flexibility of the structure and the diversity of social functions of imaginary constitutionalism, which can act as a form of ideological justification for the legitimacy of the legal system, an incentive for constitutional modernization from the perspective of changing social reality, become its brake or a justification for constitutional retraditionalization, and finally, fulfill the tasks of a radical social uto pia leading to the destruction of the supporting foundations of modern constitutionalism. This is what makes imaginary constitutionalism the sphere of developing competing social ideals, ethical and le gal norms, and legal policy, and its theorists the designers of the constitutional forms of the future