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Найдено 12 публикаций
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Статья
Krasikov I., Lamba R. Journal of Economic Theory . 2021. No. 193.
Добавлено: 3 марта 2021
Статья
Jürgen Eichberger, Pasichnichenko I. Journal of Economic Theory . 2021. Vol. 198.
Добавлено: 31 октября 2021
Статья
Moulin H. Journal of Economic Theory . 2016. Vol. 162. P. 1-20.
Добавлено: 12 апреля 2016
Статья
Nesterov A. S. Journal of Economic Theory . 2017. No. 170. P. 145-168.
Добавлено: 30 мая 2017
Статья
Behrens K., Murata Y. Journal of Economic Theory . 2007. No. 136. P. 776-787.
Добавлено: 23 ноября 2013
Статья
Janssen M. C., Parakhonyak A., Parakhonyak A. Journal of Economic Theory . 2017. No. 172. P. 120-162.
Добавлено: 10 сентября 2018
Статья
Anderson S. P., Celik L. Journal of Economic Theory . 2015. Vol. 157. P. 517-526.
Добавлено: 21 сентября 2015
Статья
Bogomolnaia A. Journal of Economic Theory . 2015. No. 158. P. 308-318.
Добавлено: 23 октября 2015
Статья
Ushchev P., Zenou Y. Journal of Economic Theory . 2020. Vol. 185. P. 104969.
Добавлено: 3 ноября 2019
Статья
Clemens Puppe. Journal of Economic Theory . 2018. Vol. 176. No. C. P. 55-80.
Добавлено: 18 мая 2020
Статья
Parenti M., Ushchev P., Thisse J. Journal of Economic Theory . 2017. Vol. 167. No. 1. P. 86-115.

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Even though preferences need not be additive and/or homothetic, the market outcome is still driven by the sole variable elasticity of substitution. We impose elementary conditions on this function to guarantee empirically relevant properties of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to market size and productivity shocks are characterized through necessary and sufficient conditions. Furthermore, we show that the attention to the CES based on its normative implications was misguided: we propose a new class of preferences, which express consumers' uncertainty about their love for variety, that yield variable markups and may sustain the optimum. Last, we show how our approach can cope with heterogeneous firms once it is recognized that the elasticity of substitution is firm-specific. 

Добавлено: 14 января 2017
Статья
Sorokin C., Zakharov A. Journal of Economic Theory . 2018. Vol. 176. P. 232-254.

We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs. We find that if a strict Nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters, then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large, but finite, electorates. If the votes are independent random events, then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates. Our results have implications for existing models of redistributive politics and spatial competition, as the properties of pure-strategy equilibria in such games carry over to equilibria in games with arbitrary candidate preferences. On the other hand, candidate utility functions will matter if the individual voting decisions are correlated. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, such as changing economic conditions or political scandals, the preferences of parties and candidates with respect to shares of votes will have an effect on political competition.

Добавлено: 4 апреля 2018