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Статья

Some difficulties of physicalistic approach

NeuroQuantology. 2012. Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 663-669.

Already within the framework of the principle of phenomenological intentionality, one is dealing with the existence of a certain inevitable intertwining of the perspective and the object upon which this perspective is directed, or, in other words, the intertwining of the object of consciousness and that of which one is conscious is guaranteed, as is their initial unity.  If we try to apply to consciousness any ‘type’ of relationship or subject–object schemes, then we immediately come up against paradoxes. It is impossible to determine consciousness by means of subject–object, not only because it is not an object, nor a subject, but also because consciousness inevitably turns out to be “prior” to all other similar distinctions. Therefore consciousness is not an object that can be enumerated or related to some other object. It cannot be separated from us; we cannot step aside from it or distance ourselves from it, for consciousness is non-spatial.