Price-Quantity Competition of Farsighted Firms: Toughness vs. Collusion

NRU Higher School of Economics , 2015. No. 93.

Сандомирская М. С.

  The paper examines an interaction of boundedly rational firms that are able to calculate their gains after reaction of an opponent to their own deviations from the current strategy. We consider an equilibrium concept that we call a Nash-2 equilibrium. We discuss the problem of existence and possible multiplicity of such equilibria, relation to infinite rationality approach of folk theorem and security considerations of equilibrium in secure strategies. For a number of models (Bertrand with homogeneous and heterogeneous product, Cournot, Tullock competition) the Nash-2 equilibrium sets are obtained and considered as tacit collusion or strong competition in dependence of additional security considerations.

Ключевые слова: молчаливый сговор, дифференцированный продукт, жесткая конкуренция в экономике, tullock contest, конкуренция по Бертрану, tacit collusion, differentiated goods, toughness of competition, рента Таллока, Bertrand competition, Nash-2 equilibrium, secure deviation, secure profile, Cournot competition, равновесие Нэша-2, безопасное отклонение, безопасная ситуация, дуополия Курно