Информационно-структурный подход в научном реализме: обсуждение и аргументы

Философия. Журнал Высшей школы экономики. 2026. Т. 10. № 1. С. 298–334.

Karpenko I.

The article presents arguments in favor of a modified version of information structural realism. The main idea of the approach is to reject the concept of material reality as ontologically primary, instead it is proposed to consider information representations that are implemented in the form of models (scientific representations) as fundamental. The key difference from the existing structural approaches is that many equivalent descriptions of reality are allowed as primary structures that have an informational nature. The new version is supported by arguments from the philosophy of science and physics (from general relativity, quantum mechanics, the theory of quantum gravity, and digital philosophy), which demonstrate that dual descriptions of reality based on fundamentally different ontologies (physical worldviews) are possible. Based on the above arguments, it is shown that the physical representations of reality and its historically main attributes, such as space and time, appearing in different models, do not agree with each other, however, there are equivalents. As a result, an information ontology is proposed in which various, including competing theoretical descriptions, are declared fundamental, which leads to epistemological and ontological relativism, but not in an anti-realistic sense, but rather in a realistic one.

Keywords: квантовая механика, duality, антиреализм, philosophy of physics, философия физики, дуальность, scientific realism, научный реализм, структурный реализм, quantum mechanics, structural realism, Anti-realism, informational structural realism, informational ontology, theory of relativity, quantum theory of gravity, информационный реализм, информационная онтология, теория относительности, квантовая теория гравитации