Измерение представительности парламента в системах пропорционального представительства
This collection of articles is presented to the reader in the framework of systems studies of elections as a class of service systems vital for democratic societies. Fundamentals of engineering systems, including those of systems servicing large customers such as electorates in local and national elections, are developed and studied at the Center for Engineering Systems Fundamentals, a part of the Engineering Systems Division at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Falling levels of electoral participation in established democracies have raised serious concern. We investigate the role of basic personal values in identifying those who do not vote. We argue that voting in specific elections offers non-voters less opportunity to affirm, protect, or attain the values they cherish than it offers to voters. We hypothesize that people who do not vote attribute less importance than voters to those values that the contesting parties actually endorse (actual value congruence) and that the parties are perceived as endorsing (perceived value congruence). Study 1 (Italian national elections of 2001, n = 1,782) confirmed the hypothesis for actual congruence between own and coalition endorsed values. Study 2 (2008 elections, n = 543) confirmed the hypothesis both for actual and perceived value congruence. In both studies, value congruence explained substantial variance in voter abstention beyond the effects of socio-demographic variables.
The research is devoted to the effects of evolution electoral systems to politics. The article analyses results of the electoral reform in Russian Federation from the point of view of elite representation. It is stated on the basis of the frequency analyses that legislative changes in countries of the electoral authoritarianism are aimed at preserving the status quo within elites. The study finds out that the proportion of regional, national and business elite representation is retained in the Russian State Duma of three terms convocations (2003, 2007, 2011).
Previous empirical research has developed stochastic electoral models for Israel, Turkey, and other polities. The work suggests that convergence to an electoral center (often predicted by electoral models) is a nongeneric phenomenon. In an attempt to explain nonconvergence, a formal model based on intrinsic valence is presented. This theory showed that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence. The necessary condition is that a convergence coefficient c is bounded above by the dimension w of the policy space, while a sufficient condition is that the coefficient is bounded above by 1. This coefficient is defined in terms of the difference in exogenous valences, the “spatial coefficient”, and the electoral variance. The theoretical model is then applied to empirical analyses of elections in the United States and Britain. These empirical models include sociodemographic valence and electoral perceptions of character trait. It is shown that the model implies convergence to positions close to the electoral origin. To explain party divergence, the model is then extended to incorporate activist valences. This extension gives a first-order balance condition that allows the party to calculate the optimal marginal condition to maximize vote share. We argue that the equilibrium positions of presidential candidates in US elections and by party leaders in British elections are principally due to the influence of activists, rather than the centripetal effect of the electorate.