Возможность свободы в недуалистических онтологиях
The paper describes the necessary metaphysical grounds and central points of J. Searle’s general theory of social reality. It shows how in a world of physical particles and fields of force, the diversity of social life is constructed with the help of one kind of logical and linguistic operations, i.e. declarations of status functions.
The Realist interpretation of 'War and Peace' - articulated by Martin Wight and Stanley Hoffmann - is based on Tolstoy's understanding of history as it is elaborated in his account of the Napoleonic invasion in the second epilogue of the book. There Tolstoy puts forward a mechanistic view of international relations which are assumed to be governed by inexorable laws of history determining human behaviour and limiting man's exercise of free will. However, Tolstoy's subjection of man to the workings of impenetrable laws of history in the second epilogue is at variance with a multiplicity of conscious moral choices that his three main characters - Nikolay Rostov, Andrey Bolkonsky and Pierre Bezukhov - make throughout the book. It is argued that the different treatment of the freedom vs. necessity problem in the fictional and historical narrative can only be understood contextually, i.e. from within Tolstoy' rejection of the Enlightenment tradition of scientific and moral inquiry.
The paper raises the question as how we can include the category of subject within physicalist ontology without postulating metaphysical freedom of will. Significance of the issue is justified through the analysis of the notion of subject in the everyday moral discourse. Suggested answer can be described as compatibilistic. Author claims that category of the subject might be highlighted in the physical world, if we could find its causally effective feature, and such feature is intentionality.
This article discusses the alternative possibilities condition in libertarian accounts of free will. It examines G.E. Moore’s conditional analysis and libertarian critics of this approach, than goes to libertarian view on the ability to do otherwise and its ontological conditions. Finally it shows that the ability to otherwise doesn’t suffice for freedom of will in libertarian sense and what is still needed remains mystery.