«Чужой среди своих» — особенности зрительного поиска знакомых и опасных объектов
The volume units different approaches to perceptual metaphor analysis.
The paper examines the properties of heavy as a perceptual concept, based on evidence from 11 languages. We demonstrate that the semantics of this concept is heterogeneous; lexemes of this field can be used in situations of at least three types: Lifting, Shifting and Weighing. These situations are either lexicalised as separate words or they converge in a single lexeme in various combinations following certain strategies. We also argue that different metaphorical extensions correspond to different situation types; this allows us to use analysis of metaphoric shifts as an additional instrument to establish the semantic structure of direct meanings.
Contemporary research in the field of developmental psychology confirms one of the main theses of W. Quine that human thinking, that deals with the ontology of everyday experience, needs not only individual, but also in general terms, based on a divided reference. Moreover, our learning of common concepts ensures contact not only with the everyday reality of the surrounding objects and events, as well as the transition to abstract concepts that are characteristic of scientific ontology. A necessary condition for comprehending general concepts about objects is the notions of a stable identity of objects in changing contexts and of not directly perceived parts of the surrounding world. For example, a child in the course of her or his development, can comprehend general concepts about objects, learning to refer not only to individual perceived objects, but also to an unobserved set of similar objects.
However, the main prerequisite for reference to objects with the help of single or general concepts is the knowledge that others also refer to the same objects and their properties, using the same words. It turns out, therefore, that the condition of objective reference is the intersubjective experience of perception of objects and events.This, however, does not imply a relativistic view of the world, but only that the perception of the surrounding world necessarily requires that other people's minds be perceived (however abstractly) as other view of the same situation of the world. According to D. Davidson, such intersubjective triangulation is the core of the concepts of truth and objectivity, without which thinking and language learning would be impossible. Hence it follows that such intersubjectivity assumes a common experience shared with other people only if from a certain age we have some knowledge of these people’s mental states. However, psychologists have not yet advanced beyond establishing a correlation between the ways a child grasps the concepts of the identity of objects and of other people’s mental states.The article proposes a solution of the problem of causal dependence between these concepts. It consists in the fact that knowledge of others’ mental states not only gives reference its intersubjective character, but is also a condition of objective reference to the objects around us in general. In other words, the perception of other people's mental states is not secondary or additional to the perception of objects, it is not a primitive theorizing or predicting someone else's behavior. On the contrary, our reaction to other minds is in fact a primary phenomenon of our perception. To substantiate this solution, the article introduces the notion of verbal gestures to unobservable objects and events. Such verbal gestures not only characterize our perception of other people's mental states, but ultimately permeate our perception of the world as a whole. In this case, all of our speech can be regarded as a verbal gesture and, accordingly, one of the essentially human modes of perceptions of the world.
In industrialized societies, male gait provides information about physical strength. Male physical strength may be used by men and women to assess the fighting ability of rivals and the quality of potential mates, respectively. Women more than men discriminate between strong and weak walkers when assessing gait attractiveness. We presented videos of British men’s gait—pre-categorized into strong and weak walkers—to male and female members (n 1⁄4 100) of the traditional Maasai in northern Tanzania in Africa. Maasai men and women judged the gaits of physically strong men less attractive than those of weak men and judged strong walkers to be weaker than weak walkers. These findings counter results from industrialized societies where participants accurately assessed strength from gait, thus arguing against a universal perception of physical strength from gait information.
The problem of making a difference between image consciousness and perception plays a great epistemological role in Edmund Husserl's works. The proposition that perception, unlike the image consciousness, reaches the thing itself but not just the copy (image) of the thing, as it is supposed by the followers of the “image-theory”, makes possible to consider the experience to be the legitimate source of knowledge (and finally to prove the possibility of science). Therefore it is very important to find out not quantitative but qualitative, essential, differences between perception and image consciousness. One of the moments, according to which the above-mentioned modes of consciousness may be distinguished, is their structure. This idea may seem evident only at first sight. According to the complicacy of structure Husserl draws a distinction between simple acts of consciousness and complex (founded) acts of consciousness. In a simple act the object is set before consciousness as an object, becomes presented to consciousness, and this makes possible to form further reference to this object (so that it may become an object of judgement, evaluation, feeling, desire etc.). Criticizing the “image-theory” Husserl points out that image consciousness is a founded act, unlike perception. It means that the object appears but isn’t taken by itself, it functions like the representant, analogue (Husserl names it “Bildobjekt”), which makes possible for consciousness to have reference to another object, which doesn’t appear and isn’t presented, but is meant by consciousness, is re-presented (Husserl names it “Bildsujet”). This proposition shows that “being representative” can’t be a “real predicate” of an object but is a result of its peculiar apperception as such by the spontaneous act of consciousness. Criticizing the “image-theory” Husserl distinguishes between the act of perception and the act of image consciousness in which image has physical nature. But it is necessary to mention that image may have mental nature as well. In the latter case an act of image consciousness is named “phantasy”. At first he supposed that phantasy is also a founded act and gave a description of it using the same scheme (Bildobjekt – Bildsujet). But hereafter he came to the opinion that “simple presentation of phantasy” is not complex but a simple act of consciousness. Despite the latter proposition seems to be more reasonable, it again rises the problem of drawing a distinction between perception and image consciousness.