Трансцендентализм Канта как особый тип философского исследования
This paper is devoted to Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophy (philosophizing), or the transcendental paradigm. For this purpose we introduce new methodological concepts as the transcendental shift, perspective and paradigm. The basis for our interpretation of transcendentalism is cognitive-semantic reading of the Critics and the theory of "two aspects". Transcendentalism is defined as a new «experimental» (Erfahrung) metaphysics and «transcendental» — as the intermedia domain (between the immanent and the transcendent) of reality, as the "instrumental" part of our cognition (consciousness).
The article attempts to reconstruct the work of F. Varela with relevance to the hard problem of consciousness. This problem was touched by Varela in relatively late period of his work. However, the implications for a dissolution of this problem can be found in his earlier works with H. Maturana. The theory of autopoietic systems ties life and cognition together. The main criterion of the living system is an ability to maintain the autopoietic organization while undergoing structural transformations with the environment. The fact of multiple realizability of the autopoietic organizations leads to radical conclusion on the nature of knowledge. One can distinguish the knower and the known only contingently, for the structure of knowledge reflects the cognitive structure of the knower. This intertwinement permits Varela to introduce the enactivist program, which presupposes not simply the reform in the scientific research of consciousness, but also rethinking of the implications of the scientific knowledge itself. Varela intended to withdraw from the very theoretical approach to the problem of consciousness. His aim was not to provide a new argument. This is a consequence of the enactivist position which, according to the theory of autopoiesis, must be applicable to the knower herself.
The article considers the major approaches towards the integration of philosophical and scientific perspectives on the nature and functioning of subjective consciousness. The project of naturalization of phenomenology is considered as an account of methodological unification of cognitive science and philosophy based on first-person perspective. This alliance is generally thought as an attempt to incorporate the explanatory models of phenomenology into the natural scientific worldview. The proponents of this approach, such as F. Varela, confirm that it can overcome the explanatory gap between the subjective first-person qualitative phenomenological data and third-person neurophysiological data, or at least it can contribute to the project of scientifically informed philosophy of mind, as in S. Gallagher’s front load phenomenology. But is it really possible to build a scientific theory of consciousness? It seems that the project of naturalization contains the inevitable shortcomings which render it impossible to take the first person approaches in cognitive science “seriously”. Hence, the first-person approach to consciousness cannot become the foundation of natural scientific theory of mind as part of nature. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness in the works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty reject the primacy of the scientific objectivist world picture, claiming that the transcendental consciousness being the condition of possibility of truth and objectivity cannot be seen from the objective point of view. Scientific worldview gives the incomplete picture of consciousness, eliminating its transcendental dimension. However, as I try to show, transcendentalism and naturalism as world projects can contribute into each other, retaining the circular relations between them. Phenomenology can integrate both world projects into holistic picture through phenomenologization, or denaturalization of natural science.
Proceedings of the 12. International Kant Congress Nature and Freedom” (Vienna, 9/21/2015–9/25/2015). Ed. Violetta L. Waibel and Margit Ruffing. Berlin 2016.
The philosophy of Mamardashvili can be presented through the prism of his philosophical style. A special place in the analysis of his ideas has been devoted to the mediative — “intermittential space of the ego” or the theory of symbols. In the research not only is the symbolic theory of Mamardashvili and Pyatigorsky analysed, but a comparative description of this theory with such concepts as transcendentalism and transcendence.
The author reconstructs the theory of F. Varela with relevance to the hard problem of consciousness. This problem was touched by Varela in relatively late period of his work. However, the implications for dissolution of this problem can be found in his earlier works with H. Maturana. Theory of autopoietic systems ties life and cognition together, resulting in natural historical comprehension of consciousness and its functioning. Autopoiesis, understood as network of processes of production of components used as resources for maintaining these processes, sets organizational invariances, distinguishing living system from its milieu. The main criterion of living system is an ability to maintain autopoietic organization while undergoing structural transformations with environment. Structural plasticity leads to multiple realizability of autopoietic organizations, which, in turn, leads to radical conclusion on nature of knowledge. One can distinguish the knower and the known only contingently, for the structure of knowledge reflects cognitive structure of the knower. This intertwinement permits Varela to introduce the enactivist program, which presupposes not simply reform in the scientific research of consciousness but also rethinking the implications of scientific knowledge itself. Cognition is a sensorimotor constitution of the world. Therefore, consciousness is not an object of material nature among other objects but provides our cognitive access to nature. Varela intended to abandon the theoretical approach to the problem of consciousness. His aim was not to provide a new argument. This is a consequence of the enactivist position which, according to theory of autopoiesis, must be applicable to the knower himself.