Speech Acts and Actions in Legal Language: conceptual analysis
Reconsideration of legal phenomena by legal language means is a typical feature of analytical tradition in the legal philosophy, since legal regulations are expressed not only in language, but are inextricably linked with the linguistic content of rules whilst applying them. Language as a form of communication and representation of the world is a holistic and specific phenomenon, that is localized in speech acts that form subject’s intentions and his further actions. It is necessary to count the meaningful use of signs for the reality perception, that form the language. Legal reality and its language forms are inseparable, and thus, we can learn more deeply the essence of legal phenomena by interpreting legal texts and speech acts that illustrate legal intentions and actions. So in the speech acts theory of J.L. Austin introduces the category of commissives, denoting the obligations declared by the intentions of the person (promise, agree, intend, plan, provide, allow, swear, etc.). In legal language speech acts are used with the purposes of execution, prohibition, coercion for maintenance of a social order, therefore legal discourse has performative character. Performative expressions in legal language are characterized by speech stereotypes due to repetitive procedures (for example, procedural actions in criminal proceedings or court hearings). If it is a question of acts of application of the right, from the point of view of their performative form they have declarative character, that is contain instructions and obligations of legal character. The illocutionary function of these proposals is to form a respectful attitude to the established norms, and the perlocutive force is to impose compliance with these norms. The question of the relation of speech acts and actions in a different context was considered by Gilbert Ryle. Ryle’s key thesis is that the workings of consciousness should not be described as a complex of some point operations, but rather should be Speech acts and actions in legal language: conceptual analysis understood in the context of observed human behavior. Consciousness is determined by the actions of the subject, not by the construction of metaphysical entities. As a man thinks, so he acts. If the researcher inspects the scene of the accident, the notary certifies the authenticity of the documents drawn up, and the judge gives arguments for the adoption of a legitimate judicial decision, they do not need the whole set of causality relationships in nature, or an explanation that human behavior is completely determined, that he is not free, because he can not control the mental processes in consciousness. H.L.A. Hart defines the essence of legal statements and their ascription of attributing legal value of a particular performative speech acts. The arguments on the specific features of legal statements in the context of the existing concepts of J.L. Austin, J. Searle, H. Hart and their critics.