Изменение модели рождаемости в некоторых республиках Северного Кавказа: только ли социальная политика важна?
The paper deals with fertility levels in some republics of the North Caucasus (Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia) where, as in some other post-Soviet regions, there has been a serious intensification of religiosity and at the same time weakening of the traditional family unit in recent decades. The goal of the paper is to ascertain whether these trends affect fertility, whose decrease is apparently stalling in the North Caucasus over the last decade. One reason to turn to this question is that in some regions of the North Caucasus the fertility level has been considerably higher since the pronatalist state policy was implemented in 2007 than in Russia as a whole. This raises the question as to whether higher fertility in the North Caucasus is mainly related to a higher demand for the state financial support granted to parents following the birth of the second (or a subsequent) child or if it can be rather accounted for by the specific cultural characteristics of that part of Russia. Our field survey held in the two republics of the North Caucasus in 2016 showed that the religiosity of respondents is related to higher fertility regardless of family policy issues. The relation between religiosity and higher fertility is arguably independent from the observance of traditional family norms which impose gender hierarchies. This suggests that an Islamic revival within a given society can support fertility whether or not traditional norms of family organization are preserved there. The conclusion for state pronatalist policy is that its outcome may be related to the cultural characteristics of the population among which such measures are implemented, apart from economic parameters that drive the demand among some families for financial support after childbirth.