Граница институциональных возможностей и производительность общественных систем: к теоретическому синтезу
The paper outlines a link between two theoretical perspectives on the prerequisites of high institutional quality and long run growth. One framework is based on the trade-off between disorder and dictatorship and introduces the notion of the institutional possibility frontier (IPF). The idea of IPF implies that social institutions can be situated on the continuum between two extrema of dictatorship and disorder; each point on the continuum has an associated level of social losses. It is implied that the dictatorship-disorder trade-off is more severe in some societies than in others. The other theoretical perspective focuses upon the role of total factor productivity (TFP) as a parameter underlying long run growth (TFP can be represented as a parameter A in the Cobb-Douglas function). It is possible to associate different social groups with different productivity factors in the Cobb-Douglas function and, further, with different institutional preferences on the dictatorship-disorder continuum. As a result, the linkage between TFP and IPF emerges and the effects of TFP can be interpreted in the framework of the IPF theory. The formalization of the linkage between two theoretical perspectives is presented in outline and it is shown that high TFP can mitigate the trade-off between dictatorship and disorder. The second part of the paper contains a tentative empirical analysis of the link between TFP and major institutional characteristics. It is demonstrated that this link is present and has from medium to high strength. An interesting innovation concerns the method of estimating TFP. By and large, the paper sheds some light on the nature of TFP and designates directions for further research on the fundamental conditions for high-quality development.
This article is focused upon the survival of democratic regimes and successfulness of democratization. The dynamical mathematical model is presented in the paper. The model’s departing point is the hypothesis of S.M. Lipset and A. Przeworski that the growth of the welfare leads to a mitigation of the interest groups` conflict over the redistribution of resources. This mitigation is met as a result of interrelated processes of broadening of a «compromise space», which is a range of mutually accepted policies, and of a convergence of different groups` preferences over the redistribution in an area of moderate policies.
The presented model illustrates how social capital (more precisely – its component responsible for trust between strangers) and institutional quality favor the stabilization of democratic regimes through the increase of economic productivity and welfare. According to the predictions of the model, total factor productivity (TFP) – understood as the opportunity of individuals and/or firms to cooperate efficiently – increases the overall wealth of the society given the same stock of human capital. It fosters the consolidation of democracy due to reduction of social tensions and improvement of functioning of democratic mechanism of economic policy elaboration. Following these results the hypothesis of positive impact of TFP on the survival of democracy is formulated.
The hypothesis was tested by means of survival analysis on the quantitative database on episodes of democratization («Regimes in the World»). The survival analysis showed that TFP is a significant and important predictor that lowers the risk of unsuccessful ending of the democratization episode (of the return back to more autocratic regime). The increase in TFP on 10 percentage points is ceteris paribus associated to the decrease of risk of leaving the track of democratization in 1.2-1.4 times. The obtained results are robust to the changes in the model specification or in a list of control variables.
Using different cross-country data sets and simple econometric techniques we study public attitudes towards the police. More positive attitudes are more likely to emerge in the countries that have better functioning democratic institutions, less prone to corruption but enjoy more transparent and accountable police activity. This has a stronger impact on the public opinion (trust and attitudes) than objective crime rates or density of policemen. Citizens tend to trust more in those (policemen) with whom they share common values and can have some control over. The latter is a function of democracy. In authoritarian countries — “police states” — this tendency may not work directly. When we move from semi-authoritarian countries to openly authoritarian ones the trust in the police measured by surveys can also rise. As a result, the trust appears to be U-shaped along the quality of government axis. This phenomenon can be explained with two simple facts. First, publicly spread information concerning police activity in authoritarian countries is strongly controlled; second, the police itself is better controlled by authoritarian regimes which are afraid of dangerous (for them) erosion of this institution.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.