Программа освобождения от наказания против картельного благополучия на российских товарных рынках
Most of collusion participants have incentives to commit to collusion because of their high estimations of future profits. However Leniency Program can affect incentives of collusion participants through the analysis of market structure changes. The analyses of Leniency Program effects on stability and duration of collusions increases the efficiency both the work of the antimonopoly authority and the antimonopoly policy in general.
The described method in the article estimated the impact of Leniency Program on the behavior of market participants based on Russian data on detected collusions and their characteristics in 2004 – 2011.
Rule of full immunity for every application, introduced by 2007 edition of Leniency Program in Russia, supports incentives to commit to collusion, instead of refraining from illegal price fixing or market sharing. But the edition of Leniency Program that has been in place since 2009, in contrast, enhances profitability of deviation from collusion, making collusions unstable. The improved version of Leniency Program in 2009 had an impact on collusion participants which can be corresponded to high sanctions in spite of the actual sanctions had been low. So even in highly imperfect jurisdiction where the fight with collusions is weak, Leniency Program can have independent significant and can present as an effective tool.