Российская армия: смена модели
The article reflects the results of the social-economical analysis of restructuring the Russian Army from the fall of the Soviet Union and until the present times. The author assumes that large-scale actions carried out by Defence ministers in 1991-2013 did not result in the establishment of the civil control institution and professionalization of the Russian Army, but only reinforced its corruption and ineffectiveness. Objects for the analysis are transformation processes in the Russian army during the post-soviet period. Close attention is paid to personal input of the Defence Ministers who led restructuring processes. The structural-functional approach to the analysis of the military institute serves as a theoretical background for the research. The article concludes that the transformation of the system of military management and the structure of military forces led to dismantling of the grand mobilization and deployment system that the Russian army inherited from the Soviet Union and to the annulment of the voluminous, however, in reality an illusory potential to lead a long-lasting war. Significantly lesser results during the military reform were reached during the gradual transition to professional armed forces system, which core is formed not by conscripts but by contract soldiers. The basis for low effectiveness of the Russian army lies in the incomplete recruitment of military units with contract soldiers and professional sergeants, as well as the overall crisis of the recruiting system.