There is a commonly held belief that police corruption in Russia is rampant. While many scholars have proposed policies on how Russian police can modernize, extant research has been static or linear. Studying the history of the developed nation-states which have successfully tackled corruption and experienced similar social organizations of shadow practices is a better approach to designing an anti-corruption policy for Russia, rather than simply borrowing foreign practices with little reference to their socio-political development. Drawing upon the Australian experience of police corruption and reform in the 1950s, we suggest anti-corruption policies for the contemporary Russian police force. To do this, we apply an event structure analysis (ESA) to identify the key organizational and institutional factors which contributed to the formation and subsequent dissolution of the First Joke, a corrupt police network which operated in the Queensland Police Force from 1950s—1980s. We design our policy recommendations taking into consideration the particularities of the Russian police and our ESA of the First Joke. Our analysis suggests that curtailing cumbersome state regulations and the over-reliance on police performance evaluation, establishing democratic oversight, improving the current recruitment and selection system, developing community policing alongside further market liberalization and democratization could be effective policies for Russia.
This article compares the differences and similarities between Finnish and Russian work life, with special focus on how employees perceive the importance of employment and pay, favouritism in the workplace, and satisfaction with leadership. The contrasts between the two countries make for an interesting comparison: Finland is one of the world leaders in quality of work life, while many workplace practices in Russia date from the Soviet era. Our analysis shows that, as expected, pay is much more important than job content to Russian employees, while job content is more important than pay to Finnish employees. Work and employment is highly valued in both countries, but more so in Russia. Russia is often described as backward in its management and leadership styles, yet we found that Russian employees are more satisfied with some aspects of leadership in the workplace than Finnish employees.
The authors consider cooperation as a specific, alternative form of economic organization to the standard business firm within a market economy, and focus on agricultural cooperation in Russia. First, the article engages with the key milestones of the history of cooperation in Russia: (1) the first attempts to establish cooperative organizations before the Russian Revolution (agricultural societies, agricultural partnerships and credit cooperatives) which gave the poor rural population a chance to improve living standards and ensured promising prospects for the long-term development of cooperation in all forms; (2) the dependent forms of consumer and production cooperation under the Soviet regime that deprived all collective forms of their true cooperative nature. In the second part of the article, the authors describe the current state of the cooperative movement in the Russian countryside and identify its basic features, such as opposition to family farming and the state capitalist tendencies of the concentration and vertical integration in the form of agroholdings; state rural cooperation policies which aim to promote and financially support small farming including the development of rural cooperatives; the number and types of cooperatives in the countryside; the reasons for debates on cooperation legislation; the viability of the main types of agricultural cooperatives (production, consumer, credit cooperation). Finally, the authors emphasize that cooperation in contemporary Russia does not fit the classic Western scheme of cooperative development and still has to overcome a number of substantial challenges (the soviet legacy, lack of bottom-up initiatives, the ideological and economic dominance of large-scale farming, poor academic expertise in the field of cooperation studies).
This paper addresses the general question raised in the recent study ‘Is New Russia New?’ (2016). The author of this article develops the idea that new Russia is new. He argues with some of the findings of the considered study. The main points are as follows: the changes in Russia are better understood within a transitional discourse; the unique way of Russia is to constitute a Democratic Power integrated within a European civilization; the ‘statist’ path of Russia is not a curse, but a tunnel of opportunities for social solidarity; the social structure of Russia is mostly based on income stratification and class elements, which are likely to coexist with post-industrial traps, like unskilled labor, or the precariat; the human development of Russia is higher than in the Soviet Union, though its growth has reached saturation point; neoliberal policy is a kind of new rut for Russia, which crucially obstructs the structural reforms and perspectives for its successful transition towards the informational age that has yet to arrive.
The paper addresses a set of ways to conceptually organize and represent ethnic diversity though law and politics. The point of departure is an examination of the Russian law on non-territorial autonomy for ethnic groups (1996) and the conclusion that the law virtually has no practical value. A wider study reveals that the idea of "non-territorial autonomy" and its practical implications have much in common with the approaches resting on the notions of "multiculturalism" and "minorities". Also a comparison of legal and administrative practices related to ethnicity demonstrates that a variety of terminologies employed in different national contexts may denote similar ideas, decisions and outcomes. Ethnic differences are described in terms of "group" and "culture"; the issues of territorial affiliation becomes the crucial one; the theme of equality is being reduced to the issues of a "fair" classification and taxonomy of groups. It turns out that these approaches have no utilitarian meaning, but rather contribute to a publicly acceptable representation of social reality. These observations allow us to question the specific position of Russia in the area known as "nationalities policy" or "ethnic relations". Reversely, one can talk about some local manifestations of the global trends in the perceptions and representations of ethnic diversity. It is supposed that actual "diversity policies" stem from a set of essentialist and group-centric assumptions which have become universally accepted. The meaning of these "diversity policies" can be explained in terms of symbolic (re)production of social reality. Dissemination of these socially acceptable narratives concerning ethnic diversity turns to be a mechanism of power and social cohesion.
On the eve of Russia's accession to the WTO the most critical position occupied by farmers . The reasons for this lie on the surface and were reduced to non-competitiveness of the agrarian economy against the background of a well-functioning system of state support for foreign manufacturers. After two years, it makes sense to discuss what business predictions come true, and which are not; that has brought the business practices WTO membership; how business and government bodies have learned to use the tools of the World Trade Organization to protect the interests of domestic producers. The article presents the results of research, which is based on the semiformalized interviews with the heads of agricultural associations and top managers of large agricultural holdings, as they have information about the dynamics of state industries. In the article the business strategy prior to the entry into the WTO and in the course of adaptation to the new conditions, identified the main challenges of the adaptation process. Russia's WTO membership was not for the Russian agricultural business catastrophe, as foreshadowed the most active opponents of joining the organization. However, the positive things that supporters touted the WTO (the inflow of foreign investment, lower food prices, the output of Russian producers on world markets, etc.), also did not materialize. Adaptation to the new conditions is reduced to the strategies of "defense" or "offensive", that means, respectively, minimizing negative or positive maximization associated with the WTO. The "defense" certainly dominates the rhetoric of Agribusiness.
The paper aims to compare situation of poverty in Russia with the BRIC countries as well as developed countries (Germany and Great Britain), which represent various models of socio-economic development. It is shown that specifics of poverty situation in a particular country can be considered correctly only when the stages in the historical development of a country are taken into account. It is revealed and described in the paper there are three main regimes of structural poverty that are typical for different historical epochs and economic systems – preindustrial, industrial, and post-industrial poverty; the situations with these types of poverty in the countries of interest are also explored. The paper includes a brief overview of the determinants of poverty caused not only by structural reasons, but also by both family and personal circumstances of an individual. It is shown that the specificity of the poverty in Russia compared to other countries is reflected in its exceptional heterogeneity as well as in the unique combination of various types and forms of poverty in Russia, which is mainly depicted by the industrial type of poverty and in higher extent – by the family and personal circumstances of people. It is concluded that heterogeneity of poverty in Russia is determined by still persisting multistructural character of Russian economy and enormous differences in socio-economic development of various regions. Just this clearly apparent heterogeneity, which is reflected in coexisting of poverty regimes that are typical for different historical epochs within particular regions and settlement areas, contributes mainly to the specificity of ‘Russia-like poverty’. The paper also suggests a number of measures to reducing poverty (related to investment, tax, immigration, social and other areas of public policy) that take into account its national specificity
The paper gives the quantitative assessment of household poverty in Russia using absolute, relative, and subjective approaches towards poverty measurement. The analysis of poverty is done on the basis of RLMS data set for 1994-2009. The level of absolute poverty decreased from 50% to 22%, however the level of relative poverty remains the same. According to the subjective estimations about two thirds of the population consider themselves poor and these estimations proved to be stable. Families with kids have the bigger changes to be poor in Russia. The new poor in Russia are specially families with 1-2 children. The share of poverty in cities and villages came closer to each other. The most unwealthiest regions are Volgo-Vyatsky and West-Siberian. The paper gives a complete picture of poverty characteristics in Russia with help of structural and regional specifics.
This article explores the changes in public perceptions of poverty and inequality in Russia, based on representative surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences between 2003 and 2016. The findings reveal that changes in public perceptions of poverty and inequality in Russia largely mirror the actual trends pertaining to these phenomena. Although decreasing poverty, and its changing causes, has made the problem itself of lesser concern to Russians, the diminishing concern about poverty has been replaced by growing concern regarding increasing inequalities.
Russians increasingly stigmatize the poor, which can be explained by the fact that poverty had become mostly a marginal phenomenon by 2014 and that Russians became less prone to perceive poverty as being caused by structural factors. On the other hand, they still recognize that particular circumstances may lead to poverty. As a result their perceptions become more individualized. Therefore, to address the problems of the poor, Russians increasingly demand a more differentiated policy which would alleviate these circumstances. Further, Russians have a clear understanding of the ‘poverty threshold’, i.e. the minimum subsistence income and particular characteristics of poverty such as malnutrition, the lack of money to buy clothes and to satisfy other basic needs without going into debt. This understanding is stable and therefore it has become more relevant to define poverty as relative deprivation.
The findings also reveal that Russians are highly tolerant of the social inequality caused by the factors assumed to be legitimate in the paradigm of equal opportunities. The current level of inequality, however, is perceived as highly excessive and is more often attributed to illegitimate factors. This pushes the demand for redistributive policies.
The article concludes by outlining the more specific contours of a social policy which would correspond to the current structure of preferences. Such a policy implies not so much a monetary means of support, but a further improvement of institutions which enable legitimate ways of individual attainment, a reduction in the factors leading to poverty, and equal opportunities for everyone.