?
Феномен «бутылочного горлышка» в торговых отношениях Евросоюза с Россией
Under what conditions might the potential for weaponizing economic interdependence through sanctions in EU-Russia relations be exhausted? Focusing on the exemptions provided under Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, the paper develops a typology that distinguishes between humanitarian and diplomatic derogations, special reservations for deal-making, individual derogations, and exemptions justified by economic security reasons. As for the latter, the analysis draws on trade statistics from 2021 to 2023 – calculating export growth rates from Russia to the EU and employing the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to assess the geographical concentration of exports within the integration bloc. The findings contribute to the literature that views EU anti-Russian sanctions as a tool of weaponization of economic interdependence in Russian-European relations, while also delineating the limits of such weaponization. In particular, the study introduces the bottleneck effect concept observed when EU sanctions policy-making stalls for objective reasons. Here, “bottleneck” does not imply inability to impose sanctions. It reflects a scenario in which sanctions are driven by economic market dynamics rather than political logic contrasting with many other areas of bygone Russian-European cooperation now under sanctions. The paper identifies three cases of this effect: a) when the EU prioritizes other policy objectives over weakening Russia; b) when the imposition of sanctions is stalled for humanitarian reasons – thereby potentially increasing the risk of weaponization via tariff regulation measures; c) when major EU countries guard certain longstanding elements of trade and economic interaction with Russia that are vital for their own economies.