The article aims to identify and analyze factors behind the success of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) policy during its fifty-year history. Giving insights in the ASEAN approach to Southeast Asia’s international security challenges during the Cold War, the author then turns to ASEAN’s policy towards the establishment of Asia-Pacific multilateral dialogue platforms on security issues through the prism of identifying the external and internal prerequisites for its success. The article highlights the most important global and regional challenges that ASEAN is currently encountering, and its readiness to respond appropriately. Finally, the article focuses upon the degree of ASEAN’s relevance to its partners in terms of its potential contribution to the establishment of Greater Eurasia. In the author’s view, necessary preconditions for ASEAN’s successful policy are emerging there. The relevance of the undertaken analysis rests upon ASEAN’s eagerness to raise its сompetitiveness against the downward trends in relations between global actors and the upcoming projection of their contradictions on the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia. Among the key reasons behind ASEAN’s successes and failures during and after the Cold War, the author identifies readiness of ASEAN’s partners to regard it as a unified entity, give it the privilege to moderate multilateral cooperation, and readiness of ASEAN itself to assume this mission. These three conditions predetermined ASEAN’s international policy success, mainly manifested by the resolution of the Cambodian issue and establishment of multilateral dialogue platforms in the Asia-Pacific region. Realizing that only the multipolar world gives it chances for a decent future and encountering the rise of conflict in the current global political and economic affairs with its projection on Southeast Asia, the Association aims to develop cooperation in Greater Eurasia. This corresponds to the priorities of ASEAN’s Eurasian partners over the establishment of a continental security, cooperation and co-development system, with ASEAN as an important actor. The presence of the three basic prerequisites for ASEAN’s high international competitiveness and their synergy give ample reasons to expect new ASEAN “success stories”, this time in Greater Eurasia.
The current global recession comes on the heels of an extended economic growth period. At least 85 percent of this economic expansion was owed to the knowledge-based sectors where massive innovation occurred in the first decade of the 21st century. International financial markets saw a rapid growth in capitalisation that, on one hand, benefited the emerging economies and, on the other, provided overblown credit to the American economy from China as well as other developing countries with hobbled domestic consumption. Global financial markets tied the US economic cycle to that in the rest of the world economy. Once the American sub-prime market began to plunge, shock waves permeated other countries leading to the loss of investor confidence and an ensuing massive contraction of stock value. All that produced an especially strong impact on the emerging economies. Most of these proved to be much less resilient than expected by some economists who had maintained that a solid basis for sustained growth had already been in place at least in the most advanced of the developing countries. As long as none of the international financial institutions was capable of delivering an adequate response to the crisis, economic nationalism became widespread. As a result, any emerging post-crisis economic order will be based on enhanced intervention by state authorities and transformed property rights in the leading economies.
By studying the process of reform of the Schengen acquis in 2011-2013 inspired by the Arab Spring andthe inflow of migrants to the Mediterranean shores of the European Union, this paper seeks todemonstrate how policy entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity that open following an externalshock (a notion is used to conceptualize the events of the Arab Spring) in order to fulfill their ownpreferences, regardless of the substance of the external shock in question. How could it happen that thereform initiated by Italy and France in 2011 to “re-nationalise the Schengen” would in the end turn outto be just the opposite of what they sought to achieve? The article suggests that the major factor whichhelps explain this is the institutional position of the European Commission which holds exclusive rightof legislative initiative, and the fact that by using its position, the Commission was able to win over theEuropean Parliament to its side by effectively making it a veto-player in negotiations with the EUCouncil, thus trapping the Member States into the “joint decision trap”. The research traces the reformprocess through all of its stages: starting with the agenda-setting by the Italian authorities who appliedalarmist rhetoric trying to securitize the migrants arriving to the Italian shores, proceeding with thechoice between alternative solutions proposed by different actors and policy reform initiation,multilateral negotiations between the EU Member States and the European Parliament and, concludingwith the adoption of the two legislative acts. The concluding remarks put the case into the broader
theoretical perspective of comparative politics.
The article studies two traditional realist types of behavior - balancing and bandwagoning. Historically, the policy of balancing was typical to large states - the Great Powers who tried to restrain each other and thus maintain balance of power in the international system. Others - small and medium countries were more likely to bandwagon, because of their inability to resist external pressure from the Great Powers independently. The collapse of the bipolar system introduced significant adjustments. In particular, small and medium countries now have new opportunities to balance external threats. Integration has become a process where it became very clear. On the one hand, integration gave some benefit to these countries, especially within close cooperation and removal of trade barriers with economically more successful and powerful states. However, on the other hand, such a disproportionate convergence created for small and medium countries certain threats. Lack of economic borders increased their dependence on the stronger partners, while creation of supranational branches of power moved this dependence on a political level, as supranational institutions, of course, took into account interests of major subjects of integration primarily. Taking into account that processes of regional integration have been coming increasingly intensive during the last decade, the author targeted to study in this context new behavior of small and medium countries. It was found that balancing and bandwagoning are two components of their integration policy. The ratio of balancing and bandwagoning influences development of the integration process. When small and medium countries accumulate sufficient resources to build the balancing policy, integration slows down. It means that for the successful integration with small and medium countries needs a permanent dominance of bandwagoning over balancing in their integration policy.
Barry Buzan - author of numerous articles and monographs. The most famous of his works : "People, states and Fear : An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era", "From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social structure of Globalization" ect. He comes from unusual but equally simple idea: just as people live in societies that they formed, also the states lives in an international society which they form.
The end of the Cold War greatly contributed to the spread of thesis that the military power as a means of achieving states' goals within the rules and institutions based global liberal order had become completely obsolete. Indeed, the number of direct military engagements among nations (interstate wars) has been on its historically lowest level for the post-Cold War period, though militarized conflicts within stated in the problem-ridden areas have not lost their severity. However, this same period has seen over 45% worldwide military expenditures rise, and quite a few states have acquired more sophisticated military hardware. These facts support the assertion that today military power is still being taken into account, it is used as a means of achieving goals and influences the behavior of states even without being applied to adversary, or if conflict has not escalated enough to call it a full-scale war. Two hypotheses are proposed and tested in the article. They may help to explain why states continue to invest scarce resources into maintaining their military potentials and procurements of weapon systems, which may never be used in combat. Firstly, we hypothesize that the available military potentials of states allow to determine to what extent and which states rely or do not rely on this component of the national potential of influence in the world (i.e. for whom the military power has not become obsolete). Secondly, countries for which military power has not become obsolete demonstrate generally similar configurations of components of military power (i.e. evolution of the militaries of these states may show strong similarities). To test the proposed hypotheses, quantitative methods have been used to analyze data on 98 countries of the world at two points in time (2005 and 2015/2016). The cluster analysis in general confirms our hypotheses. The comparison of clusters as of 2005 and 2015/2016 indicates that the states under similar external conditions (for example, constant external pressure, rivalry with neighbors, etc.) build up (or lose) similar components of the military power.
The very first steps in ASEAN research in the Soviet Union were made at a time when the Association was perceived as an unfriendly coalition and many experts were skeptical about its future. Current researchers of ASEAN in Russia work in a completely different environment and hardly recall those perceptions. However, the systematization of knowledge about ASEAN research as well as an understanding the dynamics of its development could help to assess the productivity of the academic work that has been done and adjust it to the highest standards. The article analyzes the development of the research programme related to ASEAN in the USSR and Russia. The first part of the article identifies stages of its evolution and describes the key trends. Two stages are defined in the Soviet period indicating the intensity of the research (from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s and from the mid-1980s to 1991). Russian studies since the end of bipolarity are divided into three stages in accordance with the changes that triggered the growth of interest to ASEAN in the academic circles of the Russian Federation (from 1991 to the mid-2000s, from the mid-2000s to 2014 and from 2014 to the present). The article further specifies the institutional structure of ASEAN research in the USSR and Russia and outlines its key directions. Increasing attention to ASEAN is resembled in the growth of the institutions involved, number of publications, joint initiatives and events. Nevertheless, most of them still involve organizations located in Moscow while regional structures are less active. It seems that the intensification of analytical and scientific work related to ASEAN in regional universities (especially in Siberia and the Far East) is likely to have a positive impact on the effectiveness of cooperation between Russia and ASEAN in the future. At the moment there are both opportunities and limitations for further development of Russia-ASEAN relations. In this regard enhancing our work on joint publications, international exchanges and individual research initiatives can create a basis for taking more advantage from the track II diplomacy in the upcoming projects.
Scientific and technological advances have always affected international relations. While in the middle of the 20th century it was the nuclear revolution that had a significant impact on the international structure, in the beginning of the 21st century the information revolution plays such a role. Scientists predict that in the forthcoming decades, world politics will be affected by breakthroughs in nano- and biotechnologies, as well as information technologies and the exploration of new sources of energy. Following E. Skolnikoff, the authors believe that the impact of science and technology on international affairs may be classified as operating through one of four main mechanisms: 1) changing the architecture of the international system: its structure, its organizing concepts, and the relations among its actors; 2) changing the processes by which the international system operates, including diplomacy, war, administration, commerce, communications; 3) creating new issue areas, new constraints and trade-offs in the operational environment of foreign policy, not only political constraints on international action, but also constraints imposed by the laws of natural and social science; 4) providing a source of changed perceptions, information and transparency for the operation of the international system, and of new concepts and ideas for international relations theory. In addition to understanding the influence of scientific and technological discoveries on the world of political processes, the article identifies risks and threats associated with the development of science and technologies, as well as the main areas of international cooperation in this field, while also looking at the economic dimension of scientific and technological processes. Particular attention is paid to the information component of the modern global scientific and technological sphere. In conclusion, the authors dwell on the role and place of Russia in the global innovation process.
In the multipolar world regional powers play an increasingly important role, as they strive to become leaders and shape the regional order. It is a common situation, when in one region several powers compete to become a sole leader, however, other types of interaction also exist for example, asymmetric leadership. Asymmetric leadership denotes a situation when one power does not strive to become a sole leader in one region in all spheres, but the scope and type of its involvement in addressing common problems in the region varies. This paper explores the phenomenon of asymmetric leadership using the PRC policy in Central Asia as an empirical case. The theoretical part of the paper outlines the major points of the leadership theory in international relations, which are later used to evaluate China’s policy in Central Asia. In the empirical part we explore institutions, regional focus, goals and resources of the Chinese initiatives, as well as analyze factors that influence regional strategy of a rising power. In Central Asia the PRC has expressed leadership ambitions in several issue areas, such as non-traditional security, economic cooperation and development assistance, financial governance, and environmental cooperation. However, its strategy has varied from sphere to sphere in terms of institutionalization, overall regional focus, involvement of other regional power, etc. For example, in the sphere of non-traditional security and financial governance, the PRC has initiated the establishment of special institutions, which are absent in other spheres. The case of Central Asia, which has traditionally been Russian sphere of influence, allows us to investigate the possible responses of one regional power to leadership projects of another. Russia plays different roles in Chinese projects in Central Asia: a co-leader in counter-terrorism sphere, a follower in financial governance, a competitor in economic cooperation, and an observer in environmental protection sphere. The role of Russia is determined by the available resources in each area and its own leadership ambitions, as well as the desire of the PRC to maintain friendly relations with Moscow.
The sphere of security provision is expanding and constantly bringing in new elements, including cyber- security, information security, computer network security, etc.). The arsenal of security tools is also grow- ing due to the ongoing proliferation of digital technologies (e.g. different technologies and telecommuni- cation channels for collecting, forming, processing, transmitting or receiving information related to security of the state). The article provides an analysis of current methods and technologies for crime forecasting in the national security domain. Achievements in the Data Science and Big Data generated the scientific basis for the development of Intellectual Data Analysis (Intellectual Analysis, Predictive Analysis), based on which mathematical and statistical forecasting of socially dangerous, criminal acts was designed (e.g. anti-terrorism algorithms, algorithms for predicting the activities of organized crime/gangs). The article aims to identify major trends and potential benefits of digital technologies pro- liferation as well as the challenges that states face while using mathematical and statistical methods for predicting crime. The meta-analysis of scientific researches and implementation of crime forecasting algorithms in different countries (such as USA, China, Japan, Singapore, India) helps to demonstrate a pluralism of approaches in the application of forecasting systems. The first part of the article presents the methodological and technical aspects of criminal data mining. The second part provides an overview of national practices in using crime prediction algorithms by the examples of Singapore, Japan, and India. The third and fourth parts are devoted to a more detailed analysis of the strategies and tactics of using algorithms in the USA and China, respectively. The analysis reveals the risks and benefits inherent in the most frequently applied mathematical and statistical crime forecasting algorithms. First, it is the “milita- rization” of the civilian sphere. Second, the algorithms, which do not take into account the social, cul- tural and political features of a given society, lead to the loss of statistical significance of forecasting. Third, historical data (recorded crimes) often contain racial, sexual, and contextual biases. Fourth, existing approaches do not pay heed to personal characteristics of a subject, as well as decision-making processes not infrequently resulting in wrongful conduct. Finally, there is no state control over the balance between the use of algorithms and respect for human rights.
The 2016 EU’s Global Strategy introduced the concept of resilience. The goal of this article is to identify continuity and change between resilience, on the one hand, and civilian (soft) power and normative power (two concepts that previously formed the ideational basis of the EU’s foreign relations), on the other hand. Three aspects are compared: historical context of how three concepts developed; the role of values and interests; and correlation between internal and external for the EU’s processes in the articulation and realisation of the concepts. Historical aspects demonstrate three differences. The concepts of civilian power and normative power emerged as a result of the analysis of the EEC / EU’s activities at the peak of their developments; they have mostly been used in the academia and did not require any official explanation. Resilience was borrowed from the international practice at the time when the EU faced various crises. However, the EU substantially transformed this concept, which required official explanations. The EU has made an effort to reconcile values, formulated earlier, with interests of today. The notion of principled pragmatism and values defined as interests have been used accordingly. The EU also pays attention to risks (as oppose to the resources of resilience and relevant governance techniques). The instruments to promote values have also undergone transformation: the EU puts greater responsibility on its partners, the process of values’ promotion became more technocratic whereas the EU prioritises dialogues with civil societies of third countries. Therefore, we suggest defining the EU’s resilience as defensive normative power. Finally, resilience, like civilian power and normative power before, is used to bridge the EU’s internal developments with its external activities. However, the EU’s resilience is context-based. Norms are promoted unilaterally, the inclusion of partners into the core is not foreseen. The EU expects transformation on the part of its partners but stabilisation and protection of what has been achieved for itself (rather than further reassessment and development of norms). This interpretation of resilience contradicts the notion of the normative power but allows for parallels between resilience and civilian (soft) power.