Bureaucratic Appointments in Hybrid Regimes

2012. No. 11.

Noah Buckley, Гарифуллина Г. А., Рейтер О. Д.

Scholars associate bureaucratic quality with economic development. One particularly important component of a well-functioning bureaucracy is meritocratic promotion. This paper explores the conditions under which politicians will appoint high-level bureaucrats on the basis of economic performance. We argue that two key features of democracy—electoral competition and media freedom—  increase  the incidence of performance-based appointments among high-level bureaucrats. We test these claims using original data on turnover among 3762 vice governors in Russia’s 89 regions between 2001 and 2011. We also find that levels of bureaucratic turnover depend on the characteristics of the principal making those appointments.    

Ключевые слова: политика, политические науки, regional elites, bureaucratic turnover

ПУБЛИКАЦИЯ ПОДГОТОВЛЕНА ПО РЕЗУЛЬТАТАМ ПРОЕКТА: Институты и экономическое развитие: роль бюрократии и эксперименты как метод анализа и оценки реформ (2012)