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Degree of Manipulability of Known Social Choice Rules in the Case of Multiple Choice
P. 577-591.
The problem of the manipulability of known social choice rules in the case of multiple choice is considered. Several concepts of expanded preferences (preferences over the sets of alternatives) are elaborated. As a result of this analysis ordinal and nonordinal methods of preferences expanding are defined. The notions of the degree of manipulability are extended to the case under study. Using the results of theoretical investigation, 22 known social choice rules are studied via computational experiments to reveal their degree of manipulability.
In book
Кн. 3. , М. : Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2009
Ivanov A., , in : Data Analysis and Optimization. In Honor of Boris Mirkin's 80th Birthday. : Springer, 2023. P. 157-168.
Manipulation is a situation when an agent misrepresents his/her preferences to obtain a better result of an aggregation procedure. It was proven in literature, that there is no non-dictatorial aggregation procedure which is non-manipulable. A number of papers studying the degree of manipulability of aggregation procedures have been published since then. Such papers either look ...
Added: January 26, 2024
Ivanov A., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2022 № 5(57) С. 14-23
Abstract. Manipulation is a phenomenon when an agent or a group of agents misrepresent her/their preferences in the ballots in order to obtain a better outcome of the social choice. It has been proven that there is no not-dictatorial social choice rule which is nonmanipulable. There are two approaches to fi nd the least manipulable ...
Added: January 26, 2024
Fuad Aleskerov, Karabekyan D., Ivanov A. et al., , in : Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models. : Cham : Springer, 2021. P. 231-249.
Added: April 14, 2021
Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S., / National Research University Higher School of Economics. Series WP BRP "Basic research program". 2021. No. 249.
Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the US (1998), school admissions systems in New York (2004), Chicago (2009-2010), Denver (2012), some cities in ...
Added: September 6, 2021
Subochev A., В кн. : XVII Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества: в 4 кн. Кн. 1.: М. : Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2017. С. 111-120.
A set of related majority rule-based social choice correspondences are considered: the union of minimal Р-dominating sets MPD (Duggan 2011, Subochev 2016) the union of weakly stable sets MWS (Aleskerov & Kurbanov 1999), the union of minimal P-externally stable sets MPES (Wuffl et al. 1989, Subochev 2008) and the union of minimal R-externally stable sets ...
Added: June 26, 2016
Aleskerov F. T., Karabekyan D., Ivanov A. et al., , in : Procedia Computer Science. Vol. 122: 5th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management, ITQM 2017.: Elsevier, 2017. P. 993-1000.
The coalitional manipulability of 13 majoritarian aggregation schemes (voting rules) is studied by computational experiments. We consider a special case of coalition formation in which all agents of manipulating coalition report the same first-ranked alternative upon manipulation, i.e. a group of agents misrepresents their preferences and they agree that the same alternative will be on ...
Added: July 16, 2018
Subochev A., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2016 № 2(30) С. 181-192
Recently, three ratings of Russian economic journals have been independently proposed by Mura-vyev (2012), Balatsky (2015) and researchers from the Higher School of Economics (2014). In this paper, quantitative estimates of their (in)consistency are obtained. Additionally, these three order-ings are compared to journal rankings based on values of Science Index and 2- and 5-year impact ...
Added: June 26, 2016
Karabekyan D., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2022 № 5(57) С. 24-37
Some distortions are possible in the process of preference aggregation. For example, one voter who is pivotal for some preference profi le may not read instructions properly and accidently submit wrong preference. We study how different voting rules react to these distortions for three, four and fi ve alternatives with computer modelling. One of the ...
Added: January 17, 2023
Khromova E., , in : Recent Advances of the Russian Operations Research Society. : Cambridge : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020. Ch. 11. P. 177-196.
Added: October 31, 2021
Veselova Y. A., В кн. : Фундаментальная информатика, информационные технологии и системы управления: реалии и перспективы. FIITM-2014: материалы международной науч.-практич. конф. : Красноярск : Сибирский федеральный университет, 2014.
When a society needs to take a collective decision one could apply some aggregation method, particularly, voting. One of the main problems with voting is manipulation. We say a voting rule is vulnerable to manipulation if there exists at least one voter who can achieve a better voting result by misrepresenting his or her preferences. ...
Added: December 25, 2014
Veselova Y. A., / Высшая школа экономики. Series EC "Economics". 2012. No. 17/EC/2012.
We consider the problem of manipulability of social choice rules in the impartial anonymous and neutral culture model (IANC) and provide a new theoretical study of the IANC model, which allows us to analytically derive the difference between the Nitzan-Kelly index in the Impartial Culture (IC) and IANC models. We show in which cases this ...
Added: October 9, 2012
Nesterov A. S., Theoretical Economics 2022 P. 1-28
In this paper we investigate when a series of reforms of school admissions mechanisms are motivated by fairness concerns. Prior to the reforms as well as after, the mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation and unfair as they may have blocking students who miss schools that they are entitled to. We show that some of these ...
Added: December 5, 2022
Скрыпник Д. В., Шаклеина М. В., Zaytsev A., Экономическая политика 2024 Т. 97 № 1
The article examines the impact of counter-sanctions (agri-food embargo) on the well-being of the Russian population. We use multi-stage methodology of econometric analysis that considers the objective difficulty of obtaining quantitative estimates of counter sanctions impact. Three groups of the population were distinguished in terms of welfare based on the data of the 23-rd wave ...
Added: February 14, 2024
Aleskerov F. T., Ivanov A., Karabekyan D. et al., Procedia Computer Science 2015 No. 55 P. 1250-1257
Aleskerov et al. [1] and [2] estimated the degree of manipulability for the case of multi-valued choice (without using any tie-breaking rule) and for Impartial Culture (IC). In our paper, we address the similar question for the multi-valued choice and for Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). We use Nitzan-Kelly's (NK) index to estimate the degree of manipulability, which is calculated ...
Added: December 4, 2015
Nesterov A. S., Journal of Economic Theory 2017 No. 170 P. 145-168
I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist. I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal ...
Added: May 30, 2017
Bonkoungou S., Alexander Nesterov, Theoretical Economics 2023 Vol. 18 No. 3 P. 965-991
Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical ...
Added: December 9, 2022
Nesterov A. S., Минибаев К. Р., Ломакин А. С., Economics Letters 2023
We examine incentive compatibility of various school choice mechanisms as measured by the number of manipulating students. We find that Boston with Skips Mechanism, Secure Boston Mechanism, and Chinese Mechanism may have more manipulating students than Boston Mechanism. Similarly, Taiwan Mechanism with smaller deductions may induce more manipulating students than Taiwan Mechanism with larger deductions. ...
Added: October 6, 2023
Aleskerov F. T., Meshcheryakova N., Shvydun S. et al., , in : 6th International Conference on Computers Communications and Control (ICCCC) 2016. : Oradea : Agora University, 2016. P. 118-123.
The problem of quick detection of central nodes in large networks is studied. There are many measures that allow to evaluate a topological importance of nodes of the network. Unfortunately, most of them cannot be applied to large networks due to their high computational complexity. However, if we narrow the initial network and apply these ...
Added: June 8, 2016
Bonkoungou S., Nesterov A. S., Theoretical Economics 2021 No. 16(3) P. 881-909
Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms, the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain ...
Added: September 6, 2021
Nesterov A. S., Минибаев К. Р., Ломакин А. С., Economics Letters 2023
We examine incentive compatibility of various school choice mechanisms as measured by the number of manipulating students. We find that Boston with Skips Mechanism, Secure Boston Mechanism, and Chinese Mechanism may have more manipulating students than Boston Mechanism. Similarly, Taiwan Mechanism with smaller deductions may induce more manipulating students than Taiwan Mechanism with larger deductions. ...
Added: March 10, 2024
Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I., , in : Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation. : Ryerson University, 2020. P. 120-132.
For the two-dimensional Downsian model the degree of manipulability of 16 known aggregation procedures, based on the majority relation, is evaluated using the Nitzan-Kelly index. Extended preferences for multi-valued choices are used to evaluate the fact of manipulation. Individual manipulability of agents is considered, when manipulating agent moves its ideal point over the plane. The ...
Added: September 3, 2020
Peresetsky A., / University Library of Munich, Germany. Series "MPRA Paper". 2011. No. 41507.
The binary and multinomial logit models are applied for prediction of the Russian banks defaults (license withdrawals) using data from bank balance sheets and macroeconomic indicators. Significantly different models correspond to the two main grounds for license withdrawal: financial insolvency and money laundering. Analysis of data for the period 2005.2–2008.4 for accurate prediction of a ...
Added: March 16, 2013
Shvydun S., , in : Procedia Computer Science. Vol. 139: 6th International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Management.: Elsevier, 2018. P. 182-189.
Nowadays, we have seen a growing number of networks where nodes are connected to each other through different types of relationships. This makes identification of their topological structure and key elements both important and problematic. In this paper we propose a novel model for influence assessment in such networks using social choice rules. We evaluate ...
Added: October 20, 2018
Peresetsky A., / Научно-исследовательский центр РЭШ. Серия WP "Препринты Научно-исследовательского центра РЭШ". 2010. № WP/2010/085.
In the paper we analyze the reasons of Russian bank license withdrawal, formulated in orders of CB RF at the period 2005.2 –2008.4. During this period, after establishing deposit insurance system in Russia, two mai reasons were “money laundering” and “financial insolvency”. We design binary choice logit models and multinomial logit models to model probability ...
Added: June 15, 2013