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Manipulability of Majoritarian Procedures in Two-Dimensional Downsian Model

P. 120–132.
Karabekyan D., Yakuba V. I.

For the two-dimensional Downsian model the degree of manipulability of 16 known aggregation procedures, based on the majority relation, is evaluated using the Nitzan-Kelly index. Extended preferences for multi-valued choices are used to evaluate the fact of manipulation. Individual manipulability of agents is considered, when manipulating agent moves its ideal point over the plane. The range of possible manipulating positions of the agents is restricted to some rectangle on the two-dimensional coordinate space, within the feasible area of positions of alternatives and agents. The preferences of agents are assumed to be linear orders, constructed by the proximity of the alternatives to the agents, ordered according to Euclidean distance. The computer calculations, using Monte-Carlo simulations has been performed for 3, 4, and 5 alternatives and for even number of agents from 4 to 20. 100 thousands profiles were generated for each number of alternatives – number of agents case. The results of the simulations show that there are groups of procedures with relatively low degree of manipulability for all of the considered multiple-choice extensions.

Language: English
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Keywords: manipulabilityMajoritarian choice proceduresSpatial Downsian model
Publication based on the results of:
Decision making and data analysis in socio-economic and political systems (2020)

In book

Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation
Ryerson University, 2020.
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