?
Алгоритмы расчета точных значений индексов манипулируемости для случая трех альтернатив
Abstract. Manipulation is a phenomenon when an agent or a group of agents misrepresent her/their preferences in the ballots in order to obtain a better outcome of the social choice. It has been proven that there is no not-dictatorial social choice rule which is nonmanipulable. There are two approaches to fi nd the least manipulable social choice rules. The fi rst one implies fi nding a theoretical formula for each rule. However, there are many known social choice rules and a list of manipulability indices which make this task very hard. The second approach is to generate a set of random profi les to obtain an approximate values of manipulability indices. We developed an algorithm which allows to get not approximate, but exact values of manipulability indices for any given social choice for the case of 3 alternatives. We provide the description of the algorithm, its optimizations, memory and time needed compared to the previously known algorithms, as well as the examples of the results.