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Правовое обоснование как элемент научного объяснения в юриспруденции
Legal reasoning as a phenomenon of legal science has not yet been considered in modern science as an umbrella term containing a great epistemological potential as an element of scientific explanation. In the article, the author proposes the study of legal reasoning from the standpoint of two large areas of law: theoretical and practical legal sciences. The legal reasoning is presented as a connecting element of the dichotomous areas of legal science, which allows not only to qualitatively study the existing law enforcement material, but also to predict, building theoretical structures for the further development of the legislative sphere.
Legal science as a whole cannot be imagined without argumentation, which is used not only in law enforcement, but also in a theoretical plane; and without explanation, which reveals itself not only in communication, but also in the substantiation of legal phenomena by science, which is extremely valuable for the epistemological aspect of law. That is why it is so important to distinguish between the concepts of "argumentation" and "explanation", which are not always revealed only with the help of context. Legal justification as an element of scientific explanation helps the legal discipline to systematize not only the legal practice associated with decision-making, but also the methodological apparatus.
The first part of the article is devoted to the study of legal reasoning in a theoretical context, from the standpoint of philosophy, logic and semiotics of law. The author argues that legal justification is a special linguistic metasystem that allows considering law in all its interdisciplinary diversity with the help of not only related humanities, but also natural sciences.
The second part of the article affirms the rationale as a legal methodological apparatus, with the help of which the selection of suitable arguments for the decision is made, which is formulated in the mind of the subject making the legal decision on the basis of the idea of the eidos of "good" and "fair".