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Дистрибутивные теории справедливости: от утилитаризма и обратно
For half a century, the problem of justice has been one of the most controversial
and debated in Western academic science. For the Anglo-American tradition, the
starting point for controversy about distributive justice can be considered 1971, when
the philosopher John Rawls published work The Theory of Justice. This book made a
revolution, on the one hand, provoking a large-scale discussion on the question of what
fair principles should be used in our society, and, on the other hand, finally brought
deontological ethics to the leading positions in political philosophy, which replaced the
utilitarian approach. Several decades after the publication of Rawls's work, the debate
within the framework of the deontological approach to justice reached a kind of dead
end, having failed to develop a universal position. Other areas of thought have become the most discussed topics in political philosophy. At the same time, the discussion within
the framework of the problem of distributive justice remained extremely relevant, since
directly related to the distribution of public goods, which is always one of the main
problems of political choice. One of those who suggested a way out of the current impasse
was the philosopher Amartya Sen, who proposed an original concept for solving, called
“the capability approach”. The purpose of this article is to illustrate how Sen was able to
overcome the difficulties faced by Rawls's theory and other new theories of social contract.
The author of the article believes that Sen, in fact, returned to a kind of utilitarian ethics,
in the controversy with which Rawls developed his deontological version of the theory
of justice. The article attempts to substantiate that the capability approach is a kind of
synthesis of deontological ethics and utilitarianism. The article examines utilitarian
ethics, its criticism from Rawls, and the solution that Rawls proposes in the framework
of the deontological approach, examines the main differences between new theories of
social contract and Sen's the capability approach. The article analyzes Sen's criticism
of the theory of Rawls and his followers and Sen's solution to the problem of justice.
Particular emphasis is placed on the comparison of deontological and utilitarian views
on the problem of justice. At the end of the work, it is concluded that the deontological
ethical position on the issue of justice, which has firmly taken the leading positions in
the Anglo-American academic community since the 1970s. XX century at the turn of the
century could not remain monolithic and faced serious criticism. Utilitarianism, so heavily
criticized by Rawls, is back in a new iteration of Sen's the capability approach.