Logical aliens and where to find them

Logical Investigations. 2020. Vol. 26. No. 2. P. 160–175.

Maksudova-Eliseeva G.

This paper is concerned with Frege’s logical aliens argument against psychologism in logic that leans on the ideas of uniqueness of logic and the understanding of normativity of logic in such a way that everybody should obey the rules of the classical logic system in all circumstances.  The paper argues that this argument becomes too radical in the context of current philosophy in logic. The possible answer to Frege’s argument could be inspirited by the philosophical ideas of later Wittgenstein: we play different language games, and some of them are logical games. Logical reasoning is to be understood as a kind of dialogical practice and in the process of the ontogeny people learn some sorts of logical games typical for their culture and concerned with their activity.  However, different people have different criteria of certainty and not all of them can play logical games. The capacity to play logical games depends on various factors (e.g. culture, educational level, motivation, etc.) and it is connected with main practices that one involved in. In order to talk about logical aliens one should first find out what criteria of certainty his opponent has and what language game he or she plays. This gives new comprehension of the normativity of logic that shows that there are no logical aliens in absolute sense. This view can give in turn a new understanding of what rationality is and show why logic and psychology should interact.

Keywords: reasoning, language games, philosophy of logic, certainty, Frege, normativity of logic, logical aliens

Publication based on the results of: ­­ Semantics and Pragmatics of Agency (2019)