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Of all publications in the section: 20
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Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2001. № 8. С. 302-312.
Added: Oct 25, 2009
Article
Vasyukov V. L. Logical Investigations. 2013. No. 19. P. 353-365.

Recently some elaborations were made concerning the game theoretic semantic of Lℵ0 and its extension. In the paper this kind of semantics  is developed for Dishkant’s quantum modal logic LQ which is also, in fact, the specific extension of Lℵ0 . As a starting point some game theoretic interpretation  for the S L system (extending both Lukasiewicz logic Lℵ0 and modal logic S5) was exploited which has been proposed in 2006 by C.Ferm˝uller and R.Kosik . They,  in turn, based on ideas already introduced by Robin Giles in the 1970th to obtain  a characterization of Lℵ0 in terms of a Lorenzen style dialogue game combined with bets on the results of binary experiments that may show dispersion.

Added: Jun 21, 2013
Article
Vasyukov V. L. Logical Investigations. 2017. Vol. 23. No. 2. P. 76-95.

It is well-known that the concept of da Costa algebra [3] reects most of the logical properties of paraconsistent propositional calculi Cn, 1< n <w introduced by N.C.A.da Costa. In [10] the construction of topos of functors from a small category to the category of sets was proposed which allows to yield the categorical semantics for da Costa's paraconsistent logic. Another categorical semantics for Cn would be obtained by introducing the concept of potos { the categorical counterpart of da Costa algebra (the name \potos" is borrowed from W.Carnielli's story of the idea of such kind of categories)

Added: Jun 29, 2018
Article
Vasyukov V. L. Logical Investigations. 2019. Vol. 25. No. 1. P. 70-87.

The paper is the contribution to quantum toposophy focusing on the abstract orthomodular structures (following Dunn-Moss-Wang terminology). Early quantum topo-sophical approach to "abstract quantum logic" was proposed based on the topos of functors [E, Sets] where E is a so-called orthomodular preorder category — a modification of categor­ically rewritten orthomodular lattice (taking into account that like any lattice it will be a finite co-complete preorder category). In the paper another kind of categorical semantics of quantum logic is discussed which is based on the modification of the topos construction itself — so called quantos — which would be evaluated as a non-classical modification of topos with some extra structure allowing to take into consideration the peculiarity of nega­tion in orthomodular quantum logic. The algebra of subobjects of quantos is not the Heyting algebra but an orthomodular lattice. Quantoses might be apprehended as an abstract re­flection of Landsman's proposal of "Bohrification", i.e., the mathematical interpretation of Bohr's classical concepts by commutative C*-algebras, which in turn are studied in their quantum habitat of noncommutative C*-algebras — more fundamental structures than com­mutative C*-algebras. The Bohrification suggests that topos-theoretic approach also should be modified. Since topos by its nature is an intuitionistic construction then Bohrification in abstract case should be transformed in an application of categorical structure based on an orthomodular lattice which is more general construction than Heyting algebra — orthomod-ular lattices are non-distributive while Heyting algebras are distributive ones. Toposes thus should be studied in their quantum habitat of "orthomodular" categories i.e. of quntoses. Also an interpretation of some well-known systems of orthomodular quantum logic in quan-tos of functors [E, QSets] is constructed where QSets is a quantos (not a topos) of quantum sets. The completeness of those systems in respect to the semantics proposed is proved.

Added: Jul 20, 2019
Article
Dragalina-Chernaya E. Logical Investigations. 2013. No. 19. P. 23-32.

This paper sketches two approaches to the color exclusion problem provided by model-theoretical and game-theoretical semantics. The case study, modeling the experimentally confirmed perception of “forbidden” (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colors, is presented as neuropsychological evidence for game-theoretical semantics.

Added: Jun 20, 2013
Article
Dragalina-Chernaya E. Logical Investigations. 2016. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 59-72.

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the origin and the bounds of the schematic hylomorphism in ancient and medieval logic. The sub-purposes are four-fold. Firstly, various explications of the logical hylomorphism will be illustrated. Secondly, I propose to reevaluate certain interpretations of Aristotle’s syllogistic. I attempt to answer the question why Aristotle was not the founder of logical hylomorphism. Thirdly, I aim to qualify the schematic hylomorphism of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Finally, I focus on the medieval discussions on syncategoremata and formal consequences.  

Added: Nov 2, 2016
Article
Pavlova A. Logical Investigations. 2017. Vol. 23. No. 1. P. 151-176.

In this paper we reconstruct a famous Severin Boethius's reasoning according to the idea of the medieval obligationes disputation mainly focusing on the formalizations proposed by Ch. Hamblin. We use two different formalizations of the disputation: first with the help of Ch. Hamblin's approach specially designed to formalize such logical debates; second, on the basis of his formal dialectics. The two formaliza-tions are used to analyze the logical properties of the rules of the medieval logical disputation and that of their formal dialectic's counterparts. Our aim is to to show that Hamblin's formal dialectic is a communicative protocol for rational agents whose structural rules may differ, thus, varying its normative character. By means of comparing Hamblin's reconstructions with the one proposed by C. Dutilh-Novaes we are able to justify the following conclusions: (1) the formalization suggested by Hamblin fails to reconstruct the full picture of the disputation because it lacks in some the details of it; (2) Hamblin's formal dialectic and the medieval logical disputation are based on different logical theories; (3) medieval logical disputation, represented by the formalization of C. Dutilh-Novaes, and the two ones of Hamblin encode different types of cognitive agents

Added: Jul 16, 2018
Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2009. № 15. С. 58-77.
Added: Jul 7, 2010
Article
Павлова А. М. Логические исследования. 2015. Т. 21. № 2. С. 107-133.
Added: Jul 16, 2018
Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2012. № 18. С. 60-76.
Added: Feb 12, 2013
Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2010. № 16. С. 107-120.
Added: Jul 7, 2010
Article
Рыбаков М. Н. Логические исследования. 2017. Т. 23. № 2. С. 60-75.
Added: Oct 7, 2019
Article
Копылова А. О. Логические исследования. 2018. № 1. С. 99-114.

This article presents the reconstruction of W. Ockham’s approach to the analysis of truth conditions of tensed propositions in order to clarify Ockham’s view and to present it in a systematic way. The article focuses on the chapter seven of the second book and chapter seventy two of the first book of the treatise Summa Logicae. One of the points that makes the analysis of Ockham‘s theory of tensed and modal propositions significant is the fact that he rejected the standard scholastic tool of the analysis of modal and tensed propositions — ampliation (ampliatio). Therefore, Ockham had to create his own theory that was based on his general ideas of supposition and predication that were primarily described by him in terms of the present tense. The main aim of this article is to examine why Ockham doesn’t use traditional tool for analysis of the truth-conditions in propositions about Future and Past. In the beginning of the article there is a textual reconstruction of the chapter seven, then there is an examination of the role of subject term and predication rules in this kind of propositions. Subsequently there is a general chart of the analysis of truth conditions in tensed propositions in Ockham’s view. In the article author claims that the ground of the rejection were Ockham’s ontological interests which were presented in his debate with W. Burley. Instead of traditional disjunction Ockham suggests detachment of the two senses of proposition. This idea leads to semantic controversy. Reference to the objects in past and future cannot be reduced to the reference to objects in present. Nominalism and mental language theory leads him to these semantic decisions 

Added: Dec 8, 2016
Article
Долгоруков В. В., Копылова А. О. Логические исследования. 2018. Т. 24. № 2. С. 36-58.

This paper focuses on the connection between “four-category ontologies” (which are based on Aristotle’s ontological square) and modern type-theoretical semantics. Four- category ontologies make a distinction between four types of entities: substantial universals, substantial particulars, accidental universals and accidental particulars. According to B. Smith, “fantology is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ ”. Smith argues that predicate logic cannot adequately describe these four types of entities, which are reduced to just two kinds — the general (‘F’) and the particular (‘a’). B. Smith has criticized G. Frege’s predicate logic. He argues that Frege, being the father of modern logic, simultaneously became the father of “fantology” with its ontological commitments. Smith transforms the ontological square to the ontological sextet (which also involves universal and particular events) and proposes a set of predicates for different ontological relations connecting these six types of entities. However, Smith’s approach has a number of limitations: he suggests a theory that describes only predicates of different types as universals. We argue for another formalization for the ontological square’s entities. This approach i based on modern type-theoretical semantics, according to which, the difference between substantial universals and accidental universals can be expressed. In first-order logic the sentences “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is wise” share the same logical form. However, this fact is not consistent with “ontological square” metaphysics (“being a man” is a substantial universal and “being wise” is an accidental universal). Whereas, according to the type-theoretical approach, relations to accidental universals are expressed by judgments about type (a : A), but relations to accidental universals are expressed by predication (‘P a’).

Added: Sep 26, 2018
Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2011. № 17. С. 69-83.
Added: Nov 7, 2011
Article
Карпенко И. А. Логические исследования. 2005. № 12. С. 182-194.
Added: Oct 27, 2009
Article
Карпенко И. А. Логические исследования. 2003. № 10. С. 100-109.
Added: Oct 27, 2009
Article
Карпенко И. А. Логические исследования. 2003. № 10. С. 94-100.
Added: Oct 27, 2009
Article
Васюков В. Л. Логические исследования. 2007. № 14. С. 105-130.
Added: Jul 7, 2010
Article
Копылова А. О. Логические исследования. 2019. Т. 25. № 1. С. 52-70.

The paper is devoted to the problem of supposition of terms in the propositions about imaginary objects and the conditions of their truth values in the doctrine of William of Ockham who was a leading figure of the scholastic nominalism. His rather radical ontological position acknowledges the existence of no more than two types of essences: unitary substances and qualities. Being devoid of the universals, the Ockhamist doctrine implied the transformation of the previously elaborated semantic theories, including the theory of sup- position. In the reconstruction of Ockham’s thought that became classical, the supposition closely approached the reference; however, in 2000s C.Dutilh-Novaes proposed the interpretation of supposition as a theory of propositional meanings. This approach brings forth the understanding of supposition as an intensional rather than extensional theory. One of the crucial arguments for this reconstruction is based on the application of supposition in the propositions about imaginary objects. According to our view, this argument is not free from some drawbacks. The term that makes the reference to the imaginary objects can have only simple or material supposition but not a personal one. W. Ockham names imaginary objects impossible objects.Chimaera is an impossible object, because it is considered as something which is combined of parts of different animals.That’s why it should contain several substantial forms, which leads to contradiction with the metaphysical principle of the uniqueness of the substantial form. In Ockham’s doctrine affirmative propositions about imaginary objects are always false since chimeras do not possess real existence. This observation implies that propositions about imaginary objects are more adequately squared with the extensional rather than intensional interpretation of supposition.

Added: Jul 8, 2019