Как установки и иллокутивная сила становятся компонентами смысла: некоторые следствия из анализа мнимых имён у Фреге

Слово.ру: балтийский акцент. 2023. Т. 14. № 4. С. 48–72.

Mikirtumov I.

Frege's fictitious names have sense but no denotation. They and the sentences that contain them are declared mock. Since any proper name may turn out to be imaginary, the intention of the speaker should be taken into account. When making a statement, he may mean the real or the fictitious. In the latter case, the thought cannot be expressed, and therefore one cannot arrive at a denotation. Mock thoughts at Frege mean little for decision-making and for actions, so we always want to know whether we are talking about real or imaginary. In order for this knowledge to become available, it must be made the content of sentence, i.e., thought. But not every statement carries a thought, even if it has the form of sentence. I describe three intensionalization procedures that Frege proposes to use to form a sentence that carries a thought, even if some of its components do not have denotation: the articulation of a naming relation, the formulation of a propositional attitude of intention, the formulation of a propositional attitude that expresses a metafictional context. In this way, the speaker's intention to point to a real or fictitious object becomes a component of thought, i.e., sense of sentence. Fictions themselves become components of thought if they find themselves in an indirect context, where their sense will play the role of their denotation. Taken by itself, a proper noun sense is an object with a parameter that receives a value in the situation of a particular speaker using a name. The foundations of Frege's concept are compared with some provisions of Aristotle and Leibniz.

Keywords: мысль, значение, смысл, thought, Готлоб Фреге, sense, fictions, фикции, Frege, denotation