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ПОПУЛИЗМ И КОНСТИТУЦИОННАЯ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ: ВОСТОЧНАЯ ЕВРОПА, ПОСТСОВЕТСКОЕ ПРОСТРАНСТВО И РОССИЯ
The article analyzes the contribution of populism, as a phenomenon
of public sentiments, to the dynamics of the recent constitutional
transformations in Eastern Europe, post-Soviet space and Russia. The research
shows that in all countries from the above mentioned regions populism
gave impetus to the processes of constitutional retraditionalization, which affected
different areas such as international and national law, constitutional
identity, sovereignty, forms of government, and constitutional justice.
Everywhere the mechanisms of constitutional retraditionalization invoked
by populism are associated with the denial of the principles of ideological
pluralism and political neutrality of constitutional justice. However,
the methods used in different countries vary considerably and cover the entire
gamut of technologies of constitutional revision, ranging from the “conservative
revolution” through convoking a constituent assembly or holding
a national referendum to changing preambles of constitutions, introducing
constitutional amendments, judicial interpretation, as well as a wide range of
extra-constitutional mechanisms. The choice of a particular technology or
a combination of technologies is determined by the level of public support for
populist forces and the degree of their control over government institutions.
Populism in Eastern Europe, post-Soviet space and Russia performs different
functions. In the first case populism represents a way of accumulating
protest against imperfect institutions; in the second case populism is a form
of a struggle for establishing rules of the game; in the third case populism
performs a function of mobilizing support for the current political regime, or
a means of legitimizing it. In Eastern Europe constitutional populism serves as
an instrument for achieving power, in the post-Soviet region — for its redistribution,
and in Russia — for its preservation. On the basis of these differences,
the author identifies three versions of constitutional populism — “democratic”
(Eastern Europe), “oligarchic” (post-Soviet region), and “plebiscite”, controlled
and directed by power holders themselves (Russia).