Что моделируют логики фрейминга?

Философский журнал. 2026. Т. 19. № 1. С. 163–177.

Bobrova A., Никитина И. А.

The problems of cognitive biases never stop worrying the minds of specialists from dif- ferent fields. This article demonstrates the contribution that logical-philosophical research can make to the studies of these issues. Due to its strict nature, logic exposes problems that may go unnoticed within psychology. We discuss the logical modeling of cognitive biases, such as framing effects. In general, these effects refer to the fact that people choose different solutions to a problem depending on how the problem is formulated. Using the solutions offered by modal and non-monotonic approaches as examples, we not only consider the advantages and disadvantages of each, but also highlight their critical significance for cognitive investigations. For instance, epistemic modal logics, by adopt- ing a too narrow understanding of framing effects, reduce them to the agent’s capacity to hold different beliefs with respect to equivalent statements. Moreover, these logics point to excessive ontologisation of explanatory schemes: when modeling framing effects, they presuppose initial modeling of Systems’ operations, which in reality are merely conve- nient metaphors for a set of observed phenomena. Similar problems can be found in the field of cognitive science as well. Nonmonotonic logics provide a broader perspective on framing effects, as their core characteristic is the different sequence in which information is encountered. They draw attention not only to the informational but also to the logical (non-)equivalence of different frames, raising the question of evaluating the initial equiv- alence of alternatives. It generates new questions for understanding framing effects in cognitive science.

Keywords: Epistemic modal logic, когнитивные искажения, biases, framing effects, эффекты фрейминга, non-monotonicity, (non)equivalence, эпистемическая модальная логика, немонотонность, (не)эквивалентность