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Военно-политическая стратегия Франции в ИТР после создания AUKUS
This article explores the key developments of the French Indo-Pacific strategy in the aftermath of the“submarine deal” and the creation of AUKUS in September 2021. For many observers, the misunderstanding withAustralia and the United States seemed to be a real turning point in regional policy, due to which the previouspartnerships should be inevitably recalibrated. Yet, as numerous examples show, Paris’ response is quite limitedafter all. Firstly, the article summarizes French efforts to turn the page on the “submarine deal” by restoring thedialogue with Anglo-Saxon powers. In this respect, the emphasis is made on Emmanuel Macron’s meetings withnew prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Australia as well as on his steps towards transatlantic solidaritywith Washington (not without new disagreements on the Taiwan issue, however). Secondly, several multi- andminilateral activities of French diplomacy are analyzed, such as the EU-Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum held forthe first time in Paris, 2022, or the president’s participation in the APEC summit in Thailand. It is noteworthythat France tries to find the second chance for its “Indo-Pacific axis” involving the UAE instead of Canberra andkeeping in touch with India. Thirdly, the article defines that key weaknesses of the French regional strategy arethe same as before September 2021. In particular, it still implies a certain ambiguity because the discourse on the“third way” and unwillingness to be a part of U.S.-China confrontation is followed by an indisputable affiliationof France to the collective West. French diplomatic activity is poorly supported by military capabilities given smallcontingents at overseas territories with mostly outdated weapons. The conclusion is that the AUKUS factor did notchange France’s policy in the Indo-Pacific dramatically anyway; moreover, the continuity is likely to prevail for a fewmore years.