The article researches the trends of international capital movement in general and in the leading economies in the current decade. Besides advanced economies, the article considers BRICS, CIS and EEU states as well as offshores. It is argued that while the capital flows (likewise international trade, labor migration and knowledge exchange) are forming the future of the world economy, the current stance and future of the leading world economies basically determine the volumes and distribution of the capital flows. This asym¬metrical interdependence of the dynamics of international capital flows and world economy is researched on the basis of available current examples. The forecast is made that in the coming years the growth of volumes of international capital flows is questionable. Anyway, the share of emerging economies will be increasing, especially at the expense of BRICS countries (particularly China). The article also forecasts that US role in international capital inflow would be positively impacted by US tax reform, on the one hand, and negatively touched by US political instability, on the other hand. It is noted that in spite of Brexit and the failure of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership project, the principal partners of the EU countries in the sphere of international capital flows remain the UK and USA. The developed Asian countries will retain their position of net capital exporters. As for CIS countries, foreign capital inflows will be shifting to such countries as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, while the share of Russia in FDI inflows will be decreasing.
The American political and academic elite holds inconsistent views on the balance of power between the United States and Russia. On the one hand, Russia is seen as a former great power that is in irreversible socio-economic decline, which sooner or later should lead to a reduction of Russia's presence in the international arena. On the other hand, American circles are increasingly concerned about the strengthening of Russian positions in the world in recent years, and even about Russian interference in the internal affairs of leading Western countries. It is difficult to reconcile the thesis of a country in decline with that one of the ubiquitous Russian threat. Apparently, this inconsistency is explained not only by the imperfection of adopted in the United States methodology of assessment of the Russian (and not only Russian) capabilities, but also by perceptions deeply rooted in the minds of the American elite of the US and Russia’s place in the modern system of international relations. One can state a huge gap between the United States and the Russian Federation in terms of the scale of their military and political ambitions. The US claims to be the "only superpower", being the only country in the world capable of projecting its conventional military power on a global scale. Modern Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, is not a global superpower. The Russian Federation positions itself as a great power that seeks to protect and ensure its interests in the international arena – but does not seek, unlike the USSR (and the modern United States), to remake the world in its own image. Naturally, the policy of protecting the national interests of even such a large country as Russia does not require the same extensive expenditures and expenses as the policy of inspiring the world proletarian (or, alternatively, liberal) revolution. The view of Russia as a "bully and troublemaker" (and not as a "normal" country that has the right to defend its national and state interests) will continue, as we believe, to cause a distorted perception of the real capabilities and intentions of the Russian Federation.