Межотраслевая преюдиция в гражданском процессе

Вестник гражданского процесса. 2025. Т. 15. № 5. С. 15–35.

Ilyin A.

The application of the rules of the procedural law on the scope of a verdict in a criminal case or a court order in an administrative offense case causes difficulties in practice: what is an unlawful act subject to prejudice, does it include consequences and their size, does intersectoral prejudice apply to persons involved in a civil case but not involved in a criminal case? All this requires a conceptual rethinking of intersectoral prejudice in order to understand what underlies the current procedural rules, whether there is an asymmetry of intersectoral prejudice in civil and criminal proceedings, and whether its objective limits are correctly defined in the law. In the work, all these issues are discussed in line with the doctrine of the validity of a judicial act. The author comes to the conclusion that intersectoral prejudice in civil proceedings, which implies the need to accept without proof a number of circumstances
previously established in the verdict, is a manifestation not of prejudice, but of the obligation of the sentence. It is the need to ensure the binding nature of the verdict that explains the prohibition of the court in the framework of civil proceedings to re-establish the circumstances that provided the final conclusion of the court in the criminal case.

Keywords: обязательность, преюдиция, obligation, факты, facts, compensation for harm, prejudice, legal force of a judicial act, компенсация вреда, законная сила судебного акта