Russia’s Real Interests Before and After the Fall of Damascus

Russia in Global Affairs. 2025. Vol. 23. No. 3. P. 197–220.

Royce D. P.

This article argues that Russia’s interests in Syria are limited to (1) strengthening Iran and (2) the maintenance of access to the Mediterranean and of air and naval bases on its shore. At this point, the maximal satisfaction of those interests at minimal cost would be provided by ‘Plan A’: drawing Turkiye towards Russia and Iran, inter alia ensuring Iran with access to Shi’ite Lebanon via Syria, and ensuring Russia with Mediterranean access/bases via Syria/Turkiye. If Turkiye rejects such an alignment, a decidedly worse ‘Plan B’ would entail setting up a state, based on Syria’s minorities, stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the Iraqi border. Either way, there are also non-Syrian routes (including through Russia) by which Iran can reach Shi’ite Lebanon, routes through Iran by which Russia can reach Africa and the Mediterranean, and places (other than Syria) that could or already do host Russian bases on the Mediterranean.

Keywords: Африка, Россия, Russia, Сирия, Syria, Средиземноморье, Africa, Mediterranean, российские интересы, порт Тартус, авиабаза Хмеймим, Russian interests, Tartus, Hmeimim, bases, базы